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NOTES
NEW WINE IN OLD WINESKINS: ANALYZING
STATE DIRECT-SHIPMENT LAWS IN THE
CONTEXT OF FEDERALISM, THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE, AND THE
TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT
Jason E. Prince*
And no one pours new wine into old wineskins. If he does, the new




According to wine historian Thomas Pinney, the title of "greatest
patron of wine and winegrowing that this country has yet had" belongs
to an unlikely candidate: Thomas Jefferson. 2 Although Jefferson's
role as one of America's founding oenophiles3 receives relatively little
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2005; M.Phil., University
of Cambridge, 2000; A.B., Davidson College, 1999. I would like to thank Professor
Patricia L. Bellia for providing invaluable suggestions and encouragement, and the
members of the NotreDame Law Review for their hard work on this Note. Most of all, I
wish to thank my parents, Larry andJulie, my sister, Stephanie, my grandparents, Bob
and Barbara, and my best friend, Ruth, for their constant love, support, friendship,
and guidance.
1 Luke 5:37-38. In Jesus' day, " [b]ott les ... were made of skin. When new wine
was put into [the wineskin] it fermented and gave off gas. If the bottle was new, there
was a certain elasticity in the skin and it gave with the pressure; but if it was old, the
skin was dry and hard and it would burst." WILLIAM BARCLAY, THE DAILY STUDY BIBLE
SERIES: THE GOSPEL OF LUKE 67-68 (rev. ed. 1975).
2 THOMAS PINNEY, A HISTORY OF WINE IN AMERICA 129 (1989).
3 Oenophile is defined as "a lover or connoisseur of wine." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1565 (3d ed. 1986). In considering the constitution-
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notoriety, his exploits in the field of viticulture are well documented. 4
During his time as Minister Plenipotentiary to France, 5 Jefferson ex-
tensively toured the French and German wine countries, 6 taking de-
tailed notes on the "infinite number of painstaking steps required to
produce a wine of the first quality."7 He shipped samples of his favor-
ite French wines across the Atlantic so that such friends as George
Washington and John Jay "might decide just what they would like him
to get for them in the future."8 In one shipment, Jefferson sent his
brother-in-law seventy-two bottles of "what is the very best Bordeaux
wine." 9 Moreover, while back in Virginia, he imported not only Euro-
pean wines, but also those from vineyards in Kentucky, Maryland, and
North Carolina.' 0 Declaring that "[n]o nation is drunken where wine
is cheap," I Jefferson apparently believed the beverage should flow as
freely in commerce as it did at his dinner table. 12
Yet according to some states' modern direct-shipment laws, Jeffer-
son's passion for exporting and importing fine wine would merit him
a less distinguished title: "third-degree felon." Florida, for example,
criminalizes the direct shipment of alcoholic beverages from out-of-
state manufacturers to unlicensed in-state residents and elevates re-
peat offenses to a third-degree felony. 13 All parties who "conspire" to
violate Florida's direct-shipment laws (such as consumers who place
ality of direct-shipment laws, several courts have described the plaintiffs-primarily
wine consumers who want to import out-of-state wine directly to their homes-as "oe-
nophiles." See, e.g., Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 520 n.2 (6th Cir. 2003); Dickerson
v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2003); Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 509 (4th
Cir. 2003); Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 849 (7th Cir. 2000).
4 See E.M. HALLIDAY, UNDERSTANDING THOMAS JEFFERSON 72-73 (2001); MARIE
KIMBALL, JEFFERSON: THE SCENE OF EUROPE 1784 TO 1789, at 197 (1950).
5 Jefferson began his service as Minister Plenipotentiary in 1784 and was offi-
cially relieved of his duties in 1789. KIMBALL, supra note 4, at 3, 308.
6 PINNEY, supra note 2, at 127.
7 KIMBALL, supra note 4, at 197.
8 DuMAS; MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 234-35 (1951).
9 HALLIDAY, supra note 4, at 80.
10 PINNEY, supra note 2, at 127-28.
11 AJEFFERSON PROFILE 301-02 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1956) ("I rejoice .. . at the
prospect of a reduction of the duties on wine, by our national legislature. . . . No
nation is drunken where wine is cheap .... Its extended use will carry health and
comfort to a much enlarged circle.") (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
12 Jefferson once described his daily wine consumption as follows: "I double ...
the Doctor's glass and a half of wine, and even treble it with a friend .... " FRANCIS W.
HiRST, LIFE AND LEITERS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 521 (1926). Moreover, during his first
term as President, Jefferson spent $2400 on wine each year-an expenditure that con-
stituted nearly ten percent of his annual salary. See NORMAN K. RiSjoRD, THOMAS JEF-
FERSON 130 (1994).
13 See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 561.54(1), 561.545(3) (West 2003).
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orders for out-of-state wine shipments) are guilty of the same degree
of crime as the out-of-state shipper.' 4 Thus, when a wine connoisseur
in Florida orders a bottle of chardonnay from California over the In-
ternet, he risks a $5000 fine 15 and up to five years behind bars.' 6
Over the past five years, modern-day oenophiles have launched a
bevy of constitutional challenges to direct-shipment laws. Consumers
and wine producers 17 contend that these laws violate the dormant
Commerce Clause's general prohibition against protectionist state leg-
islation.18 States and wine wholesalers19 counter that the Twenty-First
Amendment expressly prohibits the "transportation or importation
[of alcohol] into any State ... in violation of the laws thereof. 20 The
debate over how to resolve the inherent contradictions between the
dormant Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment revolves
around one issue: the extent of state power to regulate liquor
commerce.
Analyzing direct-shipment laws in the context of federalism, the
dormant Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-First Amendment, this
Note argues that the Supreme Court should uphold the states' power
to discriminate against out-of-state wine shipments. Part I highlights
federalism's role in the historical development of the dormant Com-
merce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment. This historical over-
view demonstrates a cyclical pattern in which Congress and the states
repeatedly attempted to vest regulatory control over liquor commerce
in the states, yet time after time the Supreme Court used the dormant
Commerce Clause to undermine this policy objective. In other words,
the Court engaged in judicial activism, or 'judges disallowing as un-
constitutional policy choices made in the ordinary political process
that the Constitution does not clearly disallow-'clearly' because in a
democracy the judgment of elected representatives should prevail in
cases of doubt."21
14 See id. § 562.23.
15 See id. § 775.083(1)(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
16 See id. § 775.082(3)(d).
17 See Susan Lorde Martin, Wine Wars-Direct Shipment of Wine: The Twenty-First
Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and Consumers'Rights, 38 AM. Bus. LJ. 1, 5-10 (2000)
(providing an extensive discussion of the various interest groups involved in the di-
rect-shipment debate).
18 See infra Part I.B.
19 See Martin, supra note 17, at 5-6 (naming wholesalers as a main proponent of
strong state alcohol regulatory power under the Twenty-First Amendment).
20 U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI, § 2.
21 Lino A. Graglia, The Myth of a Conservative Supreme Court: The October 2000 Term,
26 HAR. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 281, 282 (2003).
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Part II explores the major post-1933 Supreme Court cases in
which the Twenty-First Amendment and the dormant Commerce
Clause have come into conflict. Originally, the Court respected the
states' sweeping regulatory powers under the Twenty-First Amend-
ment. In 1984, however, the Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias2 2 Court rees-
tablished the dormant Commerce Clause as a device through which
the judiciary can trump Congress and the states' shared policy prefer-
ence pertaining to liquor regulation. Part III provides an overview of
state direct-shipment statutes and explores how six circuit courts' post-
Bacchus attempts to address such laws have further eroded state regu-
latory power over wine.
Part IV considers direct-shipment laws in light of Supreme Court
debate over thejudiciary's role in (1) enforcing the principle of feder-
alism; (2) guarding against state protectionism via the dormant Com-
merce Clause; and (3) applying the Twenty-First Amendment. While
the current majority supports invoking federalism to uphold states'
rights, 23 a strong minority urges allowing the political process to deter-
mine the appropriate federal-state balance. 24 The Twenty-First
Amendment constitutes a rare example of Congress and the states
shifting the equilibrium of federalism in favor of state power. Thus,
paradoxically, both sides of the federalism debate can and should cite
their respective jurisprudence in overruling Bacchus and upholding
state direct-shipment laws. Similarly, the dormant Commerce Clause's
advocates and opponents alike should respect Congress and the
states' mutual desire to grant the states broad power over liquor com-
merce. Otherwise, the doctrine will devolve from an exercise of judi-
cial intervention into a vehicle forjudicial activism, and the Twenty-First
Amendment will be reduced to virtual irrelevance.
The biblical proverb about "new wine in old wineskins" 25 serves as
a helpful metaphor for this Note's central arguments. Initially, the
Supreme Court respected Congress's and the states' policy preference
and granted the states broad Twenty-First Amendment power over li-
22 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
23 As discussed in Part IV, other commentators predict that the Rehnquist Court
will uphold direct-shipment laws on states' rights grounds. See Martin, supra note 17,
at 22-23; Gordon Eng, Note, Old Whine in a New Battle: Pragmatic Approaches to Balanc-
ing the Twenty-First Amendment, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Direct Shipping of
Wine, 30 FoRD AM UR3. L.J. 1849, 1915-16 (2003); Eric L. Martin, Note, A Toast to the
Dignity of States: What Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence Portends for Direct Shipment of
Wine, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1303, 1305, 1342, 1344 (2003). Rather than focus solely on
the Rehnquist Court's purported emphasis on states' rights, this Note investigates di-
rect-shipment laws in the context of the Court's broader federalism jurisprudence.
24 See infra Part IV.A.
25 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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quor regulation. However, in Bacchus, the Supreme Court resorted to
judicial activism by stitching together two constitutional "wineskins":
the dormant Commerce Clause (roughly 180 years old), and the
Twenty-First Amendment (over seventy years old). The principle of
federalism-itself nearly 215 years old-weaves its way through both
of these wineskins, serving as the container's uniting thread. Subse-
quently, the courts have expanded this container in ways the Twenty-
First Amendment's ratifiers hardly could have foreseen. While the
amendment has steadily ossified, the dormant Commerce Clause has
exhibited surprising suppleness. "Pouring" the direct-shipment law
debate into the Court's current three-piece patchwork threatens to
further rupture not only the Twenty-First Amendment and the dor-
mant Commerce Clause, but also the container's federalist seams.
I. OLD WINESKINS: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF FEDERALISM,
THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE, AND
THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Federalism
Although the doctrine of federalism does not expressly appear in
the Constitution's text, it has long served as one of the document's
animating principles. The U.S. federalist system divides governance
between two sets of sovereigns: (1) the national government, which
possesses "limited" powers, and (2) state governments, which enjoy
"reserved" powers.26 James Madison, "the Father of the Constitution,"
did not seek to create "a consolidation of the States into one simple
republic."27 Rather, he sought to establish a delicate balance in which
"[t] he powers delegated . . .to the federal government, are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments, are
numerous and indefinite."28 Regardless, the Framers' various post-
Philadelphia musings fall short of providing a definitive model for the
Constitution's division of power between the federal and state
governments.
To fill this theoretical void, political scientists have developed two
competing models of federalism: dual federalism and cooperative fed-
eralism. 29 Dual federalism envisions "two mutually exclusive recipro-
26 See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 83 (14th
ed. 2001).
27 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 338 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
28 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 241 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
29 STATES' RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM XX (Frederick D. Drake & Lynn R.
Nelson eds., 1999) [hereinafter STATES' RIGHTS].
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cally limiting fields of power-that of the national government and
that of the States. The two authorities confront each other as equals
across a precise constitutional line, defining their respective jurisdic-
tions."30 Cooperative federalism, on the other hand, espouses the
view that "the supremacy clause and the necessary and proper clause
of the Constitution grant power to the national government, even if
the actions of the national government touch state functions."31 This
model "views the state and national governments as partners, but the
national government sets policy for the nation."3 2
Despite the theoretical uncertainties surrounding federalism, the
Supreme Court invokes the principle to resolve conflicts between
Congress and state governments. This mediation most often consists
of "protecting the states against invasions by national institutions, ...
protecting states from incursions by their neighbors, and . . . re-
straining states from transgression on core national/constitutional val-
ues."33 Although significant disagreement exists within the current
Supreme Court over whether judges or politicians should serve as fed-
eralism's gatekeepers, 34
nearly all agree-as the Supreme Court has emphasized-that fed-
eralism serves important values. First, in comparison with the na-
tional government, state and local governments are closer to the
people and more capable of reflecting local needs, values, and mo-
res. Second, the diversity of state and local governments permits
experiment and competition .... Third, apart from its capacity to
promote government that delivers goods and services effectively,
federalism fosters connection and community .... Finally, state and
local governments function as counterweights to national power.35
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
The dormant Commerce Clause forbids states from unduly bur-
dening interstate commerce.3 6 This doctrine lacks express textual
support in the Constitution; rather, it constitutes a negative inference
30 Alpheus Thomas Mason, Federalism: The Role of the Court, in FEDERALISM: INFI-
NITE VARIETY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 8, 24-25 (Valerie Earle ed., 1968).
31 See STATES' RIGHTS, supra note 29, at xx.
32 Id.
33 William N. Eskridge, Jr. &John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political
Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1359 (1994).
34 See infra Part IV.
35 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 440-41 (2002).
36 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 401 (2d ed. 2002).
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drawn from the Commerce Clause. 37 When Congress legislates pursu-
ant to its Commerce Clause power, it can preempt state and local
laws. 38 Yet even if Congress refrains from exercising its commerce
power in a particular area, the federal courts can strike down state and
local laws for burdening interstate commerce.3 9 The dormant Com-
merce Clause enables federal courts to guard Congress's commerce
power against state protectionism. 40
As the states discovered under the Articles of Confederation, ex-
treme state protectionism (1) "is inconsistent with the very idea of po-
litical union";41 (2) "cause[s] resentment and invite[s] protectionist
retaliation";42 and (3) "diverts business away from presumptively low-
cost producers without any colorable justification in terms of a feder-
ally cognizable benefit."43 Indeed, when the Framers converged in
Philadelphia for the Constitutional Convention, remedying the ills of
"economic Balkanization" 44 presided at the top of their agenda.45
The dormant Commerce Clause's jurisprudential roots stretch at
least as far back as the 1824 Supreme Court decision of Gibbons v.
Ogden.4 6 Chief Justice Marshall attributed "great force"47 to the argu-
ment that Congress's power to regulate commerce "implies in its na-
ture, full power over the thing to be regulated, [and] it excludes
necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same oper-
ation on the same thing."48 Gradually, this concept of Congress's ex-
37 See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 26, at 234.
38 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2. This provision is commonly referred to as the
Supremacy Clause.
39 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 401.
40 See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY &
WAITE 18 (1937) ("(T]he doctrine [is] that the commerce clause, by its own force and
without national legislation, puts it into the power of the Court to place limits upon
state authority.").
41 Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1113 (1986).
42 Id. at 1114.
43 Id. at 1119.
44 The term "economic Balkanization" was obviously not part of the Framers' dia-
logue. However, in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), the Supreme Court
employed the term to describe the country's economy under the Articles of Confeder-
ation. Id. at 325.
45 CHEMERINSKV, supra note 36, at 403.
46 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
47 Id. at 209.
48 Id.
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clusive power to regulate interstate commerce became firmly
embedded in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. 49
Although the Supreme Court has upheld the dormant Com-
merce Clause for roughly 150 years, its legitimacy remains a subject of
debate. Much of this disagreement boils down to federalism and the
Court's role in enforcing it. On the one hand, Professor Donald Re-
gan argues that the Framers primarily created the Commerce Clause
"not to empower Congress, but rather to disable the states from regu-
lating commerce among themselves."50 Given that state regulations
on interstate commerce "are individually too petty, too diversified and
too local to get the attention of a Congress hard pressed with more
urgent matters,"51 the federal courts must guard against economic
Balkanization on Congress's behalf. This approach prevents state pro-
tectionism by appointing federal courts as gatekeepers, which seek to
maintain Congress's exclusive power over interstate commerce.
Professors Martin H. Redish and Shane V. Nugent counter that
the dormant Commerce Clause spawns judicial activism and "under-
mines the carefully structured federal balance embodied in the [Con-
stitution's] text."'5 2 They assert that the Framers intended Congress to
guard against economic Balkanization without the dormant Com-
merce Clause's assistance. The Framers "establishe[d] the intertia in
favor of the exercise of state power, because the states do not need to
overcome any federal barrier before they enact economic legisla-
tion."53 Unless Congress utilizes the Commerce Clause to preempt
state law, they argue, the states can seek creative and localized ways to
advance their respective economic interests.54 The dormant Com-
49 Five years after Gibbons, in Willson v. Black Bird Creek, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245
(1829), Chief Justice Marshall went one step closer to enshrining the dormant Com-
merce Clause by stating that the challenged state law could not "be considered as
repugnant to the [federal] power to regulate commerce in its dormant state, or as
being in conflict with any law passed on the subject." Id. at 252 (emphasis added).
Following the 1851 decision of Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299
(1851), the dormant Commerce Clause became a fixture of the Supreme Court's ju-
risprudence. Id. at 319 (holding that certain categories of interstate commerce are
national by nature and require exclusive legislation by Congress); see also Martin H.
Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance
of Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569, 577 (asserting that it was not until Cooley "that the
[dormant Commerce Clause] became firmly established in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence").
50 Regan, supra note 41, at 1125.
51 Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
52 See Redish & Nugent, supra note 49, at 569, 573.
53 Id. at 592.
54 See id.
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merce Clause, however, removes Congress's oversight power to the
courts, thus "shift[ing] the political inertia against the states in the
regulation of interstate commerce, and leav[ing] federal oversight of
state regulation in the hands of the government body traditionally
thought to be least responsive to state concerns." 55
Despite the misgivings of Professors Redish and Nugent, the dor-
mant Commerce Clause remains a fixture of modern Supreme Court
jurisprudence. The Court has in recent years adopted a two-step ap-
proach to applying the doctrine. First, if a state law facially discrimi-
nates against out-of-state commerce, or if it is facially neutral yet has a
discriminatory purpose or effect, the Court Will apply a strict scrutiny
test. 56 As Justice Kennedy stated in C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown, this test provides that "[d]iscrimination against interstate
commerce in favor of local business is per se invalid, save in a narrow
class of cases in which the [state] can demonstrate, under rigorous
scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local inter-
est."57 Thus far, the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence contains few cases in which a facially discriminatory law has
survived this "rigorous scrutiny. ' 58
Second, if a state law is nondiscriminatory, but nevertheless bur-
dens interstate commerce, the Court will resort to the balancing test5 9
established in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.60 Under this test, the Court
considers "the nature of the local interest involved, and ... whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activi-
ties."61 The Court will strike down a nondiscriminatory law only if the
"burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in rela-
55 Id. at 617; see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 33, at 1367 ("[T]he Court
will be more prone to strike down state or local, rather than national, regulation on
grounds of federalism. This is so in part because the Court is more likely to diverge
ideologically from any given state legislature than it is from Congress .... .
56 See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 26, at 245.
57 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994); see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571-95 (1997) (striking down a tax scheme that primarily
benefited in-state charitable organizations as facially discriminatory); Or. Waste Sys.,
Inc. v. Or. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98-108 (1994) (deeming facially dis-
criminatory a differential fee for the disposal of out-of-state solid waste).
58 See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137-52 (1986) (holding that a Maine
law banning the importation of out-of-state live baitfish was nevertheless constitu-
tional because the state had no other way to protect its uniquely pristine waters from
such baitfish's parasites).
59 See SULLLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 26, at 245.
60 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
61 Id. at 142.
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tion to the putative local benefits." 62 Both the strict scrutiny and bal-
ancing tests require the Court to probe the policy justifications
underlying state laws in order to determine if a state has unconstitu-
tionally usurped Congress's commerce power.
The doctrine set forth in C&A Carbone and Pike does not enjoy
the unqualified support of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and
Justice Thomas. These three Justices primarily object to the doctrine
because it has no textual basis and enables judicial activism in an
arena best left to Congress. For example, Justice Thomas urged the
abandonment of the doctrine because it is an "exercise of judicial
power in an area for which there is no textual basis."63 Similarly, Jus-
tice Scalia asserted that the balancing test for facially neutral laws "is
more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular
rock is heavy . . . [and is] ill suited to the judicial function. '64 Chief
Justice Rehnquist expressed alarm over the dormant Commerce
Clause's impact on federalism, criticizing the Court's "messianic insis-
tence on a grim sink-or-swim policy of laissez-faire economics ... [as]
a policy which bodes ill for the values of federalism which have long
animated our constitutional jurisprudence. '65
62 Id.; see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470-74
(1981) (rejecting a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a state law that banned
the retail sale of plastic nonreturnable containers but permitted the retail sale of non-
plastic nonreturnable containers-a major in-state product); Exxon Corp. v. Gover-
nor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 125-29 (1978) (upholding as nondiscriminatory a state law
prohibiting producers or refiners of petroleum from operating retail service stations).
63 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 612
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia has also disapproved of the dormant
Commerce Clause's lack of textual basis, stating that the "'negative Commerce
Clause' . . . is 'negative' not only because it negates state regulation of commerce, but
also because it does not appear in the Constitution." Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson
Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64 Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Ultimately, Justice Scalia begrudgingly accepts the dormant Commerce
Clause, but merely because the "vast number of negative-Commerce Clause cases
[have] engender[ed] considerable reliance interests." West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 209 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Moreover, he only supports
using the doctrine in two situations: "(1) against a state law that facially discriminates
against interstate commerce, and (2) against a state law that is indistinguishable from
a type of law previously held unconstitutional by this Court." Id.
65 West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 217 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see alsoJenna
Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path". A Theory of
Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1490 (1995) (positing a the-
ory of federalism in which "the Court should not fetishize the free national market
and should approach the [dormant Commerce Clause] cases with a more lenient eye
toward state and local police and developmental policies"); Frank B. Cross, Realism
About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1304, 1325 (1999) (suggesting that the "meaning-
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Even if these three dissenting Justices are wrong, and the Framers
did intend a dormant Commerce Clause, Congress can still override
dormant Commerce Clause rulings. Professor William Cohen asserts
that "over a century of Supreme Court decisions establish beyond de-
bate Conress's power to consent to state laws that, absent congres-
sional consent, would be invalid as unreasonable burdens on
interstate commerce. "66 Indeed, as early as 1891, the Court ruled that
Congress had the power to "divest" certain commercial articles of
their interstate character.6 7 Over fifty years later, the Court recon-
firmed that Congress possesses the "undoubted power to ... permit
the states to regulate commerce in a manner which would otherwise
not be permissible." 68 This concept of Congress's ability to carve out
exceptions to the dormant Commerce Clause played a crucial role in
the history of U.S. liquor regulation. 69 Moreover, it underscores Part
IV's discussion of federalism, the dormant Commerce Clause, and di-
rect-shipment laws.
C. Twenty-First Amendment
Early in the nation's history, the states enjoyed virtually unfet-
tered authority over alcohol regulation.70 Beginning with the License
Cases,71 the Court held that state police power permitted local liquor
regulations, regardless of the Commerce Clause's negative re-
lessness of federalism" is partly due to the fact that "the dormant Commerce Clause is
a commonly invoked constitutional constraint on state action that may be selectively
used for ideological ends").
66 William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State Laws: A For-
gotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REv. 387, 387 (1983).
67 See In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 562 (1891); inf'a note 84 and accompanying text.
68 S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945). As recently as
1982, the Court has restated its obligation to set aside the dormant Commerce Clause
in the face of Congressional action:
[W]e only engage in [dormant Commerce Clause] review when Congress
has not acted or purported to act. Once Congress acts, courts are not free to
review state taxes or other regulations under the dormant Commerce
Clause. When Congress has struck a balance it deems appropriate, the
courts are no longer needed to prevent states from burdening commerce
.... Courts are final arbiters under the Commerce Clause only when Con-
gress has not acted.
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1982) (citations omitted).
69 See infra Part I.C.
70 See Sidney J. Spaeth, Comment, The Twenty-First Amendment and State Control
Over Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CAL. L. REV. 161, 165
(1991).
71 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
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straints.72 In Mugler v. Kansas,73 for example, the Court upheld a state
law banning the production and sale of liquor.74 The Mugler Court
expressly recognized that once a state legislature established its pre-
ferred method of regulating alcohol, "it is not for the courts, upon
their views as to what is best and safest for the community, to disre-
gard the legislative determination on that question. '75
However, a mere year after Mugler, the Court backtracked on its
traditional recognition of broad state police power over alcohol. In-
voking the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court held in Bowman v.
Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.76 that a state's right to regulate li-
quor under its police power "arises only after the act of transportation
has terminated. '7 7 Shortly thereafter, in Leisy v. Hardin,78 the Court
went a step further by holding that imported alcohol constituted an
article in interstate commerce so long as it remained inside its original
package. 79 Accordingly, enterprising individuals could circumvent
their state's temperance laws by importing alcohol and then reselling
it to in-state consumers-they merely needed to refrain from remov-
ing the liquor's out-of-state packaging.
Recognizing the "original package" rule's absurd impact on local
temperance goals, Congress rushed to the states' defense. Within
four months of Leisy, Congress passed the Wilson Act,80 which pro-
vided that states could regulate imported alcohol "upon arrival" in the
same way they regulated locally produced alcohol. 8 1 Moreover, the
Act expressly overruled the Court's "original package" rule.82 Accord-
ing to the Act's sponsor, SenatorJames Wilson of Iowa, the Act sought
72 See id. at 579.
73 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
74 Id. at 662.
75 Id.
76 125 U.S. 465 (1888).
77 Id. at 499.
78 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
79 Id. at 124-25.
80 Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified as amended at 27 U.S.C.
§ 121 (2000)).
81 See id. The Act reads in relevant part:
All . . . intoxicating liquors ... transported into any State or Territory...
shall upon arrival in such State or Territory be subject to the operation and
effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its
police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as though such
liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, and shall
not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original
packages or otherwise.
27 U.S.C. § 121 (2000).
82 See id.
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to "leave every State in the Union free to determine for itself what its
policy shall be in respect of the traffic in intoxicating liquors."83
The In re Rahrer Court upheld the Wilson Act, acknowledging
that Congress could "provide that certain designated subjects of inter-
state commerce shall be governed by a rule which divests them of that
character."8 4 Professors Noel T. Dowling and F. Morse Hubbard ex-
plain this concept of "divesting" as follows: "Congress has power
under the commerce clause . . . to divest intoxicating liquor of its
interstate character-to strip it of that something which gives it immu-
nity from the operation of state laws-and the liquor, after being thus
divested, is subject to state laws. '8 5 By "divesting" alcohol of its inter-
state nature "upon arrival" in each state, the Wilson Act granted the
states broader regulatory power over liquor importations.
However, the Supreme Court soon allowed alcohol importers to
exploit yet another loophole in state temperance regimes: direct mail
order shipments from out-of-state producers to in-state consumers. In
Rhodes v. Iowa,8 6 the Court interpreted the Wilson Act's "upon arrival"
provision to mean that state liquor laws could not constitutionally ap-
ply until the alcohol shipments "arrive [ed] at the point of destination
and [were] deliver[ed] there to the consignee."87 Although Iowa ar-
gued that the Act "operate [d] to attach the legislation of the State of
Iowa to the goods in question the moment they reached the state line,"8 8
the Court disagreed. Consequently, states could not regulate alcohol
until it reached the homes of consumers, and "[in] ail order booze, of
course, flourished."8 9 Yet again, the Court used the dormant Com-
merce Clause to undermine Congress's efforts to enable state alcohol
regulation.
Eventually, temperance advocates convinced Congress to close
the direct-shipment loophole and fully divest imported alcohol of its
interstate character. The Webb-Kenyon Act, officially entitled "An Act
divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in certain
cases,"90 provided that "[t]he shipment or transportation [into a
state] ... of any ... liquor... [which] is intended... to be received,
83 21 CONG. REc. 4954 (1890) (statement of Sen. Wilson).
84 In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 562 (1891) (emphasis added).
85 Noel T. Dowling & F. Morse Hubbard, Divesting an Article of Its Interstate Charac-
ter: The Doctrine Underlying the Webb-Kenyon Act, 5 MINN. L. REV. 100, 101 (1921).
86 170 U.S. 412 (1898).
87 Id. at 426.
88 Id. at 420 (emphasis added).
89 Spaeth, supra note 70, at 173.
90 Webb-Kenyon Act, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (codified as amended at 27
U.S.C. § 122 (2000)).
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possessed, sold, or in any manner used . .. in violation of any law of
such State . . . is prohibited."9 1 Avoiding use of the phrase "upon
arrival," the Webb-Kenyon Act revoked the Court's ability to apply the
dormant Commerce Clause to state alcohol regulations. 92
Although President Taft vetoed the Act as an unconstitutional
delegation of Congress's exclusive power to regulate interstate com-
merce, 93 Congress overrode his veto. 94 Subsequently, in Clark Distil-
ling Co. v. West Maryland Railway Co.,95 the Court recognized that the
Webb-Kenyon Act "did not simply forbid the introduction of liquor
into a State for a prohibited use, but took the protection of interstate
commerce away. "96 The Court did not distinguish between discrimi-
natory and nondiscriminatory state laws; rather, it recognized that
Congress placed state liquor laws outside the dormant Commerce
Clause's ambit.9 7
Unfortunately for states' rights advocates, the Webb-Kenyon Act
emboldened temperance proponents at the federal level.98 In 1919,
the Eighteenth Amendment ushered in the temperance era's high-
water mark-nationwide prohibition of liquor.99 This amendment si-
multaneously constituted the lowest ebb of state power over alcohol
regulation. Although the amendment granted Congress and the
states "concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion," it had the practical effect of making "a seemingly invincible
states' rights movement toward local regulation of alcohol simply
evaporate[ ] in the face of federal regulation."100 The flaws of this
"one-size-fits-all alcohol regulatory regime" 10' soon became evident.
Government corruption and gangster bootlegging ran rampant, lead-
ing President Harding eventually to admit that federal regulation of
liquor had devolved into "nationwide scandal."' 0 2 This deep disdain
for the federal government's handling of Prohibition not only has-
tened the Eighteenth Amendment's demise, but also fueled a desire
91 Id.
92 See id.
93 See 49 CONG. Rlc. 4291 (1913).
94 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2000).
95 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
96 Id. at 325.
97 See id. at 324.
98 See Spaeth, supra note 70, at 174-75.
99 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
100 Spaeth, supra note 70, at 175.
101 Matthew J. Patterson, Note, A Brewing Debate: Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws and
the Twenty-First Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 761, 769.
102 LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE BuREAu OF PROHIBITION 46 (1929).
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among "Congress and.., the states to insist on state control of liquor
upon repeal."1 3
Fourteen years after its inception, national prohibition ended
with the enactment of the Twenty-First Amendment. 10 4 Section 1 of
the Twenty-First Amendment expressly repeals the Eighteenth
Amendment,10 5 and Section 3 sets a seven year time limit on ratifica-
tion. 10 6 The most crucial provision is Section 2, which declares that
" [t] he transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or pos-
session of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."'1 7 No-
tably, neither Congress nor the federal government receives any men-
tion. Unlike the Eighteenth Amendment's provision of
"concurrent"10 8 authority between Congress and the states, Section 2
seems to vest power in the states alone.
Regardless, the history leading up to the Twenty-First Amend-
ment indicates its primary purpose was to shield state liquor regula-
tions from the dormant Commerce Clause. Support for this
interpretation derives from the remarkable parity between the lan-
guage of Section 2 and the Webb-Kenyon Act.109 While the Webb-
Kenyon Act statutorily divested alcohol of its interstate character, the
Twenty-First Amendment went a step further by enshrining this sweep-
ing state power in the Constitution's text. 01 In other words, Congress
saw a Constitutional amendment as the only way to "insulate ... state
control from either congressional second-thoughts about the Webb-
Kenyon Act or a hostile Supreme Court decision striking down the
Act."] 11
Nevertheless, some commentators proffer a narrower reading of
the amendment's plain language. For example, Professor Lawrence
H. Tribe asserts that the amendment's "text actually forbids the pri-
vate conduct it identifies, rather than conferring power on the States
103 Spaeth, supra note 70, at 180.
104 U.S. CONST. amend XXI.
105 Id. § 1.
106 Id. § 3.
107 Id. § 2.
108 U.S. CONST. amend XVIII, § 2.
109 See supra text accompanying note 91.
110 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205-06 (1976) ("The wording of § 2 of the
Twenty-first Amendment closely follows the Webb-Kenyon and Wilson Acts, expres-
sing the framers' clear intention of constitutionalizing the Commerce Clause frame-
work established under those statutes.").
111 Brannon P. Denning, Smokey and the Bandit in Cyberspace: The Dormant Commerce
Clause, the Twenty-First Amendment, and State Regulation of Internet Alcohol Sales, 19
CONST. COMMENT. 297, 304 (2002).
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as such."'112 Admittedly, if divorced completely from its historical con-
text, Section 2 could be given such a reading. History, however,
makes the correctness of this interpretation unlikely. Roughly twenty
years before the Twenty-First Amendment's ratification, the Supreme
Court interpreted the Webb-Kenyon Act's language as having com-
pletely divested liquor of its interstate character. 113 Accordingly, the
amendment's drafters likely believed that their use of remarkably simi-
lar language would effectively elevate liquor's divested character to
constitutional status. Indeed, Professor Tribe himself acknowledges
that the amendment's "evident objective" was to "empower the States,
notwithstanding the inhibitions of the Dormant Commerce Clause, to
bar transporting or importing intoxicants for local delivery or
consumption."1 14
Although plain text and general history make the Twenty-First
Amendment's meaning sufficiently clear, the amendment's ratifica-
tion history also augments a broad interpretation. At first glance, the
legislative history underlying the amendment appears ambiguous.
Upon closer inspection, however, the legislative history of Senate Joint
Resolution 211' 15-the resolution that gave rise to the amendment-
supports a sweeping states' rights interpretation. Indeed, the Twenty-
First Amendment's sponsor, Senator John J. Blaine, explained that
"[w] hen our government was organized and the Constitution of the
United States was adopted, the States surrendered control over and
regulation of interstate commerce. This proposal is restoring to the
states.., the right to regulate commerce respecting a single commod-
ity-namely, intoxicating liquor."116 Similarly, in his floor statement,
Senator William E. Borah of Idaho provided an overview of the previ-
ous cases in which the Supreme Court used the dormant Commerce
Clause to frustrate Congress's efforts to empower state liquor regula-
tion via federal statute. 117 Wanting to ensure "States rights, the right
of the people of the respective States to adopt and enjoy their own
112 Lawrence H. Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution Without Really Trying: Lessons
from the Repeal of Prohibition to the Balanced Budget Amendment, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 217,
219 (1995).
113 See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
114 See Tribe, supra note 112, at 218. As discussed in Part II.A, Justice Brandeis-
whose interpretive vision was not obscured by the passage of over a half-century-had
no trouble gleaning this "evident objective" from the amendment's plain text.
115 SJ. Res. 211, 72d Cong., 76 CONG. REC. 4138 (1933).
116 76 CONG. REc. 4141 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine).
117 See id. at 4170-71 (statement of Sen. Borah).
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policies," Senator Borah demanded constitutional protection of the
states' regulatory power.118
However, other remarks made during the floor debates suggest
that Section 2 only sought to protect states that wanted to remain dry
after Prohibition's repeal. 119 For example, Senator Blaine com-
mented that Section 2 was included "to assure the so-called dry States
against the importation of intoxicating liquor into those States."'120
Similarly, Senator Borah expressed concerns about the post-Prohibi-
tion plight of dry states. I 21 Yet proponents of this narrow reading
overlook the fact that the broader interpretation of Section 2 includes
the narrower interpretation. In other words, a constitutional regime
in which states have sweeping power to discriminate against out-of-
state liquor is also a regime in which dry states have sweeping power to
remain dry. Thus, Senators Blaine and Borah could simultaneously
endorse both positions. Conversely, if they had intended to advocate
solely for a narrow interpretation of Section 2, they would not have
concurrently espoused a broad states' rights interpretation.
Moreover, the Senate's rejection of a proposed third section pro-
vides additional support for a broad reading of the amendment's lan-
guage. This controversial provision would have granted the federal
government "concurrent" power "to regulate or prohibit the sale of
intoxicating liquor to be drunk on the premises where sold." 122 Ac-
cording to Justice Black, who participated in the floor debates as a
Senator from Alabama,123
[i]t is clear that the opposition to Section 3 and its elimination from
the proposed Amendment rested on the fear, often voiced during
118 See id. at 4172 (statement of Sen. Borah).
119 See Duncan Baird Douglass, Note, Constitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the
Twenty-First Amendment and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate State Regulation of Interstate
Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49 DuKE L.J. 1619, 1634 (2000) (arguing that the Sen-
ate floor debates on Section 2 "suggest[ ] that the provision was understood simply as
protection for dry states"); cf Clayton L. Silvernail, Comment, Smoke, Mirrors and Myo-
pia: How the States Are Able to Pass Unconstitutional Laws Against the Direct Shipping of Wine
in Interstate Commerce, 44 S. TEX. L. REv. 499, 545 (2003) (asserting that Section 2's
.obscure legislative history is no help in ascertaining its true meaning," but neverthe-
less claiming the provision only sought to provide states the option of remaining dry).
120 76 CONG. REc. 4141 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine).
121 See id. at 4170-71 (statement of Sen. Borah) (expressing concerns that, with-
out Section 2, "we are asking dry States to rely upon the Congress... to maintain
indefinitely the Webb-Kenyon law").
122 S.J. Res. 211, 72d Cong., 76 CONG. REc. 4138 (1933).
123 See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 353 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that Justice Black served in the Senate during the Twenty-First Amend-
ment's ratification).
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the Senate debate, that any grant of power to the Federal govern-
ment.., could be used to whittle away the exclusive control over
liquor traffic given the States by Section 2."124
Those who discredit the amendment's ratification history as am-
biguous overlook evidence of an equally important part of the consti-
tutional amendment process: state ratification. 12 5 Unfortunately, the
states did not provide definitive statements indicating the reasoning
behind their ratification of the amendment.126 Yet, their actions fol-
lowing ratification speak louder than any express declaration. In-
deed, states immediately utilized their Twenty-First Amendment
powers to enact "'bold and drastic experiments in price control,' in-
cluding price posting, regulation by private associations, and
mandatory resale price maintenance contracts. " 127 Notably, such reg-
ulatory actions were taken by states that did not remain dry following
Prohibition. In other words, these states ratified the Twenty-First
Amendment with the understanding that it constituted a sweeping
grant of states' rights, not a narrowly tailored protection for dry states.
Plain text and history combine to suggest that Congress and the
states enacted the Twenty-First Amendment in an effort to fundamen-
tally shift the traditional federalist balance of liquor regulation in the
states' favor. As the Supreme Court repeatedly asserted, Congress can
empower the states to regulate interstate commerce in ways that
would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce Clause. 128 Following
the nation's dismal experience under Prohibition, Congress conceded
that effective liquor control required local support and local solu-
tions. 129 Accordingly, Congress proposed the Twenty-First Amend-
ment as a "liquor regulation" exception to the dormant Commerce
124 Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 337 (1964)
(Black, J., dissenting).
125 Indeed, under Article V of the Constitution, the states possess greater power to
amend the Constitution than Congress. First, Congress cannot single-handedly ratify
constitutional amendments; rather, it can only propose amendments, which three-
fourths of the states must then ratify. See U.S. CONST. art. V. Second, even if Congress
initially refused to propose amendments, the legislatures of two-thirds of the states
can force Congress to "call a Convention for proposing Amendments." Id.
126 See Spaeth, supra note 70, at 181.
127 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 357 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Joz de
Ganahl, Trade Practice and Price Control in the Alcoholic Beverage Industry, 7 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 665, 680 (1940)).
128 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
129 Cf New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single coura-
geous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
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Clause. The states ratified Congress's proposal and immediately en-
acted sweeping laws under their newfound authority.
II. STITCHING TOGETHER THE SUPREME COURT'S
JURISPRUDENTIAL PATCHWORK
Given the Court's pre-1933 eagerness to strike down state alcohol
laws on dormant Commerce Clause grounds, alcohol producers im-
mediately claimed that the post-1933 liquor regulations unconstitu-
tionally burdened interstate commerce. This Part charts such
dormant Commerce Clause suits through to the Supreme Court's
most recent rulings at the time of writing. 130
Starting with its 1936 decision in State Board of Equalization v.
Young's Market Co.,' 31 the Court did not strike down a discriminatory
state liquor law on dormant Commerce Clause grounds for nearly a
half-century. However, the 1984 case of Bacchus constituted a resur-
gence in judicial activism via the dormant Commerce Clause. The
Court yet again negated Congress's and the states' joint effort to estab-
lish a federal balance in which the dormant Commerce Clause does
not apply to state liquor regulations.
A. Sweeping State Power. 1936-1984
1. Justice Brandeis and Plain Language: The Young's Market Line
of Cases
Initially, the Supreme Court held that the Twenty-First Amend-
ment granted states sweeping powers over alcohol importations. In
Young's Market, the Court considered a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to state alcohol regulations for the first time since Prohibi-
tion's collapse. 132 A group of California wholesalers wished to import
130 Most of the previous scholarly works on state direct-shipment laws include ex-
tensive discussion of various Twenty-First Amendment cases that do not involve the
dormant Commerce Clause. Admittedly, this method has its merits. The Court pep-
pered its landmark decision of Bacchus--a case dealing exclusively with the dormant
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment-with dicta from Twenty-First
Amendment cases that had nothing to do with the dormant Commerce Clause. Ac-
cordingly, analysis of the Court's overall Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence can
prove helpful in putting the dormant Commerce Clause cases in context. At the same
time, however, this broad approach risks diluting the dormant Commerce Clause's
unique role as the driving force behind the Twenty-First Amendment's ratification.
This Note focuses almost exclusively on cases that consider both the Twenty-First
Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause.
131 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
132 See id. at 59.
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beer from Missouri and Wisconsin; in order to do so, however, they
had to pay a $500 importation license fee. 133 Given that domestic
beer producers did not have to purchase this $500 license to ship
their products within the state, the importers claimed that California's
mandatory importation license violated the dormant Commerce
Clause. 134 The wholesalers urged the Court to construe the amend-
ment to mean that "[t] he state may prohibit the importation of intoxi-
cating liquors provided it prohibits the manufacture and sale within
its borders; but if it permits such manufacture and sale, it must let
imported liquors compete with the domestic on equal terms." 135
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Brandeis bluntly rejected
the wholesalers' argument. He asserted that their interpretation
"would involve not a construction of the amendment, but a rewriting
of it."1 3 6 Because the amendment's plain language "confered upon
the state the power to forbid all importations which do not comply
with the conditions which it prescribes,' 3 7 the Court refused to con-
sider the wholesalers' argument that the amendment's history sug-
gested a narrow interpretation. 13 8 Moreover, the unanimous Court
dismissed the wholesalers' secondary argument that "a state may not
regulate importations except for the purpose of protecting the public
health, safety, or morals; and that the importer's license fee was not
imposed to that end."'39 Justice Brandeis countered the wholesalers'
claim with a rhetorical question: "If [a state] may permit the domestic
133 Id. at 60-61.
134 Id. at 61. Interestingly, Justice Brandeis ruled that California's licensing
scheme did not "present a question of discrimination prohibited by the commerce
clause." Id. at 62. Rather, he regarded the importation fee as raising constitutional
concerns because it imposed "a direct burden on interstate commerce." Id. Al-
though Justice Brandeis refrained from treating the state licensing laws as discrimina-
tory, it is difficult to view them in any other way. To bring out-of-state beer into
California, importers had to pay an extra $500-a payment not required to obtain
domestically produced beer. Similarly, the Hawaiian law considered in Bacchus Im-
ports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984), placed a twenty percent excise tax on imported
liquor but exempted certain domestic alcohol. See id. at 265. The Bacchus Court
deemed Hawaii's tax scheme facially discriminatory. Id. at 268. Thus, although the
Court's characterization of the challenged laws in Young's Market and Bacchus may
have differed, both legal regimes had the same discriminatory impact on foreign li-
quor. Regardless, Justice Brandeis suggested in dicta that the Twenty-First Amend-
ment protected even discriminatory state liquor regulations. See infra note 140 and
accompanying text.




139 Id. at 63.
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manufacture of beer and exclude all made without the state, may it
not, instead of absolute exclusion, subject the foreign article to a
heavy importation fee?' 1 40 In other words, Justice Brandeis viewed
the amendment as granting states not only the power to exclude for-
eign liquor, but also the power to discriminate against foreign
liquor. 141
Three years later, the Court upheld Young's Market in Indianapolis
Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Commission142 and Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves. 143
Justice Brandeis again wrote the majority opinion in Indianapolis Brew-
ing, which upheld a Michigan law that prohibited in-state liquor retail-
ers from selling beer produced in states that discriminated against
Michigan-produced beer.144 Basing its ruling on Young's Market, the
Court reasoned that "[s]ince the Twenty-first Amendment . . . the
right of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating
liquor is not limited by the commerce clause."'145
The Ziffrin case involved a Kentucky law that sought to "channel-
ize the traffic [of alcohol], minimize the commonly attendant evils
[and] also to facilitate the collection of revenue." 146 Upholding the
law, the Court found Kentucky's liquor regulation regime "clearly ap-
propriate." 147 The Court not only reaffirmed the states' sweeping
Twenty-First Amendment power to inhibit alcohol commerce, but also
sanctioned the states' ability to "adopt measures reasonably appropri-
ate to effectuate these inhibitions and exercise full police authority in
respect of them."'148 Thus, the trilogy of Young's Market, Indianapolis
Brewing, and Ziffrin stands for the proposition that the Twenty-First
140 Id. Notably, laws that "subject the foreign article to a heavy importation fee"
are the same as the Hawaiian importation tax that was challenged-and overturned-
in Bacchus. See infra Part II.B.
141 Two years later, Justice Brandeis again wrote for a unanimous Court in uphold-
ing a Minnesota statute that "clearly discriminate[d] in favor of liquor processed
within the State as against liquor completely processed elsewhere." Mahoney v. Jo-
seph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 403 (1938). Although Mahoney involved the Equal
Protection Clause, id. at'402, and not the dormant Commerce Clause, it confirmed
that the Twenty-First Amendment empowered states to discriminate against out-of-
state liquor.
142 305 U.S. 391 (1939).
143 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
144 Indianapolis Brewing, 305 U.S. at 392, 394.
145 Id. at 394.
146 Ziffrin, 308 U.S. at 134.
147 Id. at 139.
148 Id. at 138.
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Amendment empowers states to enact even "blatantly discriminatory
statutes."149
2. A Glimpse of Things to Come: Duckworth and Carter
The Young's Market line of cases seemed to suggest that the
Twenty-First Amendment constituted the states' primary source of
power over the transportation and importation of liquor. However,
the 1940s witnessed a reversion to the Court's pre-1888 preference for
upholding state alcohol regulations as a valid exercise of police
power.1 50 In both Duckworth v. Arkansas151 and Carter v. Virginia,'5 2
the Court considered challenges to laws requiring people to secure
permits before transporting alcohol through a state. Because the li-
quor was not intended for "delivery or use" within the state, the Court
in both cases reasoned that the Twenty-First Amendment did not ap-
ply.' 53 Both decisions nevertheless upheld the state permit require-
ments because they fell within the states' police powers. 154 Yet, in
both cases, the Court reserved the power to strike down such state
police power regulations if they extended beyond "reasonable"
bounds.' 55
In Duckworth, Justice Jackson warned in a concurring opinion that
"[i]f the Twenty-first Amendment is not to be resorted to for the deci-
sion of liquor cases, it is on its way to becoming another 'almost for-
149 Spaeth, supra note 70, at 183.
150 See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
151 314 U.S. 390 (1941).
152 321 U.S. 131 (1944).
153 See id. at 135 (stating that because "the intoxicating liquors in question are
intended for continuous shipment through [the state] ... a different question arises
from those considered under the Twenty-First Amendment, where transportation or
importation into a state for delivery or use therein was prohibited"); Duckworth, 314
U.S. at 392 (asserting that "[w]e have no occasion to decide whether the Arkansas
statute, when applied to transportation passing through that state for delivery or use
in another, derives support from the Twenty-first Amendment").
154 See Carter, 321 U.S. at 135 ("The commerce power of Congress [was] not in-
vaded by such police regulations as Virginia has here enforced."); Duckworth, 314 U.S.
at 394 ("While the commerce clause has been interpreted as reserving to Congress
the power to regulate interstate commerce in matters of national importance, that has
never been deemed to exclude the states from regulating matters primarily of local
concern . . ").
155 See Carter, 321 U.S. at 134 (noting the appellants' assertion that state police
powers are "limited by the Commerce Clause to regulations reasonably necessary to
enforce its liquor laws"); Duckworth, 314 U.S. at 396 (providing that state police power
regulations on alcohol do not violate the Commerce Clause so long as they are "rea-
sonably necessary to protect the local public interest in preventing unlawful distribu-
tion or use of liquor within the state").
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gotten' clause of the Constitution. " 156 Rather than rely on state police
power over liquor, Justice Jackson argued that the majority should
have upheld the state permit requirements because the Twenty-First
Amendment "obviously gives to state law a much greater control over
interstate liquor traffic than over commerce in any other commod-
ity."'1 5 7 By relying instead on reasonable state police power, Justice
Jackson asserted, the majority ignored the Twenty-First Amendment's
very purpose:
The people of the United States knew that liquor is a lawlessness
unto itself.... They did not leave it to the courts to devise special
distortions of the general rules as to interstate commerce to curb
liquor's "tendency to get out of legal bounds." It was their unsatis-
factory experience with that method that resulted in giving liquor
an exclusive place in constitutional law as a commodity whose trans-
portation is governed by a special constitutional provision.158
Justices Black and Frankfurter echoed Justice Jackson's concerns
in concurring opinions in Carter. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Black (who served in the Senate during the debates surrounding the
Twenty-First Amendment)15 9 stated that he was "not sure that statutes
regulating intoxicating liquor should ever be invalidated by this Court
under the Commerce Clause except where they conflict with valid fed-
eral statutes." 60 Relying on Young's Market, Indianapolis Brerwing, and
Ziffrin, Justice Black concluded that "local, not national, regulation of
the liquor traffic is now the general Constitutional policy.' 61
Similarly, Justice Frankfurter asserted that questions about state
power over alcohol regulation were "peculiarly political, that is legisla-
tive, questions which were not meant by the Twenty-first Amendment
to continue to be the fruitful apple of judicial discord, as they were
156 Duckworth, 314 U.S. at 399 (Jackson, J., concurring).
157 Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
158 Id. at 398-99 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter pursued a strik-
ingly similar line of reasoning in Carter:
It is now suggested that a State must keep within "the limits of reasonable
necessity" and that this Court must judge whether or not [the state] has
adopted "regulations reasonably necessary to enforce its local liquor laws."
Such canons of adjudication open wide the door of conflict and confusion
which have in the past characterized the liquor controversies in this Court
and in no small measure formed part of the unedifying history which lead
first to the Eighteenth and then to the Twenty-first Amendment.
Carter, 321 U.S. at 142 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
159 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
160 Carter, 321 U.S. at 138 (Black, J., concurring).
161 Id. (Black, J., concurring).
2004] 1585
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
before the Twenty-first Amendment."' 62 Because the amendment
provided a "general Constitutional policy" in favor of local regulation,
the three concurring Justices wisely urged deference to the states' pol-
icy judgments.
Conversely, both the Duckworth and Carter Courts "brushe [d]
aside the liquor provisions of the Twenty-first Amendment"1 63 in favor
of their own case law regarding state police power. Unlike Leisy and
Rhodes,164 in which the Court used the dormant Commerce Clause to
displace state temperance regulations, these decisions did not in-
stantly abridge state power over liquor. Nevertheless, just like their
nineteenth century predecessors, these cases made state liquor regula-
tions the "fruitful apple of judicial discord" 65 and created the likeli-
hood of a reversion to judicial intervention. 166
Throughout the roughly forty years following Duckworth and
Carter, the Court never questioned the states' power to enact discrimi-
162 Id. at 142 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
163 Duckworth, 314 U.S. at 399 (Jackson, J., concurring).
164 See supra Part I.C.
165 Carter, 321 U.S. at 142; see text accompanying note 158. Placing Duckworth and
Carter in broader historical context sheds additional light on the Court's eagerness to
recognize broad state police powers over liquor. In 1937, a mere four years before
Duckworth, the Court overturned Lochnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). During Lochner's thirty-two year reign, the Court
struck down roughly two hundred state laws as violating the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 592. The West Coast Hotel Court,
on the other hand, "unequivocally declared ... that government could regulate to
serve any legitimate purpose, and that the judiciary would defer to the legislature's
choices so long as they were reasonable." Id. at 600.
The Court's decisions in Duckworth and Carter coincided with the post-Lochner
trend toward respecting the reasonable policy decisions of state legislators. However,
as Justices Jackson, Black, and Frankfurter pointed out, the Court's failure to utilize
the Twenty-First Amendment actually increased the possibility that courts would strike
down state liquor laws. These three Justices regarded the Twenty-First Amendment as
requiring greater deference to state alcohol regulations than even the early post-Loch-
ner Court was willing to provide.
166 In 1958, the Court considered Gordon v. Texas, 355 U.S. 369 (1958) (per
curiam), in which the defendant had been convicted of illegally importing liquor
without obtaining a permit or paying taxes. See Gordon v. State, 310 S.W.2d 328, 329
(Tex. Crim. App. 1956). The Court upheld the challenged portions of Texas's liquor
regulatory regime with a single sentence: "Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States." Gordon, 355 U.S. at 369. Curiously, the Court also cited
Carter to support its brief ruling. Id. As discussed above, Carter relied on state police
power doctrine to uphold the challenged law, not the Twenty-First Amendment.
Thus, Gordon seems to constitute a belated nod of approval to Justices Black and
Frankfurter's concurring opinions in Carter that the Court could have equally based
its ruling on the Twenty-First Amendment.
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natory liquor laws under the Twenty-First Amendment. 167 During this
same period, however, the Court took various steps to whittle away the
states' Twenty-First Amendment powers in non-dormant Commerce
Clause cases. Notably, in a trilogy of decisions issued between 1964
and 1984, the Court declared that the Twenty-First Amendment had
not stripped Congress of its concurrent power to regulate liquor com-
merce. 168  None of these opinions threatened the Twenty-First
Amendment's preeminence over the dormant Commerce Clause. In
fact, each case paid tribute to the Young's Market line of cases. 169 Nev-
ertheless, when Bacchus170 reached the Supreme Court in 1984, the
Court resuscitated its century-old penchant for striking down state li-
quor regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause. 171
167 Indeed, in the 1966 case of Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S.
35 (1966), the Court once again confirmed the states' sweeping regulatory powers
under the Twenty-First Amendment. Seagram involved a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to a New York price-affirmation statute, which required liquor producers to
affirm that their New York prices were no higher than the lowest price offered else-
where in the country during the preceding month. Id. at 39-40. The Court held that
the "mere fact that [New York's price-affirmation statute] is geared to appellants' pric-
ing policies in other States is not sufficient to invalidate the statute." Id. at 43. Begin-
ning in 1983, the Court has subsequently narrowed the states' power to require price
affirmation in a series of three decisions. See infta notes 171 and 195.
168 See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984); Cal. Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon
Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
169 See Capital Cities, 467 U.S. at 712 (noting that Young's Market stands for the
proposition that Section 2 "reserves to the States power to impose burdens on inter-
state commerce in intoxicating liquor that, absent the Amendment, would clearly be
invalid under the Commerce Clause"); Midcal, 445 U.S. at 107 (pointing to the
Young's Market line of cases in confirming that "each State holds great powers over the
importation of liquor from other jurisdictions"); Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 330 (highlight-
ing the Young's Market line of cases in asserting that the Twenty-First Amendment
renders a state "totally unconfined by traditional Commerce Clause limitations when
it restricts the importation of intoxicants destined for use, distribution, or consump-
tion within its borders").
170 Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
171 It might be argued that the Supreme Court quietly presaged the dormant
Commerce Clause's imminent resurgence in Healy v. United States Brewers Ass'n (Healy
1), 464 U.S. 909 (1983). Decided roughly one year before Bacchus, Healy I revolved
around a Connecticut price-affirmation statute, which sought to prevent beer produc-
ers from selling below Connecticut wholesaler prices to any wholesaler in a neighbor-
ing state. See U.S. Brewers Ass'n, Inc. v. Healy, 692 F.2d 275, 276 (2d Cir. 1982). The
Second Circuit struck down Connecticut's price-affirmation statute as an unconstitu-
tional burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 284. Based on the Supreme Court's
ruling in Seagram, the Second circuit acknowledged that Connecticut could require a
beer brewer to "set its Connecticut prices at the lowest levels it [chose] to set in sur-
rounding states." Id. at 283-84. However, the Second Circuit determined that the
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B. Bacchus and the Full-Fledged Return of Judicial Activism:
1984-Present
In Bacchus, out-of-state liquor wholesalers challenged a Hawaiian
law that imposed a twenty percent excise tax on wholesale alcohol
sales. 172 Specifically, the wholesalers protested the law's exemption of
Hawaiian-produced okolehao 173 and fruit wine from the excise tax.
Hawaii's legislature enacted this exemption with the express hope of
encouraging development of the state's liquor industry. 174 The
wholesalers argued that Hawaii's tax regime violated the dormant
Commerce Clause by favoring certain in-state beverages. 175
From the opening lines of its analysis, the Court turned Young's
Market on its head. In Young's Market, the Court began its examina-
tion by first asking whether the challenged law fell within the state's
broad Twenty-First Amendment powers. 176 Once the Court deter-
mined that the state did possess the requisite regulatory power, it did
not explore whether the law violated the dormant Commerce Clause.
The Bacchus Court, on the other hand, began by subjecting the Hawai-
ian tax exemption to the modern two-prong dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. 17 7 Finding that "the purpose of the exemption was to
aid Hawaiian industry,"178 the Court deemed the exemption "clearly
discriminatory." 179 Accordingly, Hawaii did not deserve "entitlement
to a more flexible approach permitting inquiry into the balance be-
tween local benefits and the burden on interstate commerce."' 8 0
state could not pursue the "far more drastic, and clearly excessive, method of control-
ling minimum prices at which liquor may be sold outside of its own territory." Id. at
284. In other words, the Second Circuit ruled that Connecticut's price-affirmation
statute did not fall within the Twenty-First Amendment's protection of state laws per-
taining to the "delivery or use [of liquor] therein." U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the Second Circuit's decision. Healy I,
464 U.S. at 909. Although the Court refrained from providing any reasoning, it soon
elaborated on the unconstitutionality of price-affirmation statutes shortly after
Bacchus. See infra note 195. Regardless, Healy I signaled that state regulatory power
under the Twenty-First Amendment was not invulnerable to dormant Commerce
Clause challenge.
172 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 265.
173 According to the Court, "[o]kolehao is a brandy distilled from the root of the
ti plant, an indigenous shrub of Hawaii." Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 266.
176 State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936).
177 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 270. For an overview of the Court's strict scrutiny analysis,
see supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
178 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 271.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 270.
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Having ruled that Hawaii's tax exemption "violated the Com-
merce Clause because it had both the purpose and effect of discrimi-
nating in favor of local products," 18 1 the Court then asked whether
the exemption was "saved by the Twenty-first Amendment to the Con-
stitation."182- Turning to a balancing test, the Court inquired
"whether the principles underlying the Twenty-first Amendment
[were] sufficiently implicated by the [tax] exemption.., to outweigh
the Commerce Clause principles that would otherwise be
offended."18 3
The Court did not analyze the amendment's text and dismissed
the provision's ratification history as "obscur[e]."'81 4 Despite its pro-
fessed "[d] oubts about the scope of the Amendment's authorization,"
the Court concluded that "[t] he central purpose of the provision was
not to empower States to favor local liquor industries by erecting bar-
riers to competition." 1 5 Accordingly, the Court struck down Hawaii's
tax exemption "because [it] violate[d] a central tenet of the Com-
merce Clause but [was] not supported by any clear concern of the
Twenty-first Amendment."18 6 While the Twenty-First Amendment's
''central purposes" and "clear concerns" played a crucial role in the
Court's decision, the Court did not define these novel terms. Moreo-
ver, the Court reached its holding without ever expressly overruling
Young's Market, rather, it jettisoned stare decisis by relegating the case
to a footnote. 187
Justice Stevens, joined by then Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor, dissented on the grounds that "the wholesalers' Com-
merce Clause claim [was] squarely foreclosed by the Twenty-first
Amendment. 18 8 According to Justice Stevens, the majority adopted a
"totally novel approach to the Twenty-first Amendment."'1 9 In his es-
timation, the proper question "is not one of 'deference,' nor one of
'central purposes'; the question is whether the provision in this case is
an exercise of a power expressly conferred upon the States by the
Constitution." 190
18] Id. at 273.
182 Id. at 274.
183 Id. at 275.
184 Id. at 274.
185 Id. at 276 (emphasis added).
186 Id. at 276 (emphasis added).
187 Id. at 274 n.13.
188 Id. at 279 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189 Id. at 286-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190 Id. at 287 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Looking first to the text, Justice Stevens read the amendment to
expressly authorize Hawaii's tax exemption. Because the tax applied
to the sale of liquor intended for consumption in Hawaii, it "[fell]
squarely within the protection given to Hawaii by the . .. Twenty-first
Amendment, which expressly mentions 'delivery or use therein."' 91
Justice Stevens then reviewed the events leading up to the Twenty-First
Amendment's enactment, highlighting Congress's efforts to overturn
Leisy by divesting liquor of its interstate character. 192 Moreover, he
retrieved Justice Brandeis's Young's Market opinion from the majority's
footnotes and pointed out the Court's previous adherence to a broad
interpretation of the amendment. 93 Ultimately, Justice Stevens
concluded:
If the State has the constitutional power to create a total local mo-
nopoly-thereby imposing the most severe form of discrimination
on competing products originating elsewhere-I believe it may also
engage in a less extreme form of discrimination that merely pro-
vides a special benefit . . . for locally produced alcoholic
beverages.194
Unlike Justice Stevens's bright-line approach-which would have
respected text, history, and stare decisis-the majority opinion re-
verted to its pre-Webb-Kenyon Act judicial activism. Ignoring the
amendment's text, eschewing prior case law, and dismissing the provi-
sion's history, the Court opted for a vague balancing test that enabled
broad judicial discretion. By applying its dormant Commerce Clause
analysis first, the Court placed a presumption of invalidity on the chal-
lenged state law-a presumption states can only overcome by wading
into a murky realm of "central purposes" and "clear concerns."1 95
This failure to specify the Twenty-First Amendment's "central
purposes" or "clear concerns" rendered Bacchus a blank check for fu-
191 Id. at 280 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 280-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193 Id. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 286 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195 Just as Bacchus brushed aside Young's Market, two post-Bacchus cases dealing
with price-affirmation statutes obliterated Seagram, see supra note 167 and accompany-
ing text, without expressly overruling its holding. First, in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp.
v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986), the Court struck down a New
York price-affirmation statute because it had "the 'practical effect' [of] control[ling]
liquor prices in other States." Id. at 583 (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan,
325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945)). Similarly, in Healy v. BeerInstitute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989), the
Court overturned a Connecticut price-affirmation law because "the Commerce Clause
... precludes application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly
outside the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the
State." Id. at 336 (citations omitted).
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ture judicial activism. The Bacchus Court hinted that "combat[ing]
the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor"' 96 constituted
at least one of the amendment's "central purposes." On the other
hand, the Court held that "mere economic protectionism" 97 could
notjustify discriminatory state regulation. More recently, in North Da-
kota v. United States,198 the Court implied that "promoting temperance,
ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue" 9 9 might
pass muster as legitimate exercises of state power under the Twenty-
First Amendment. However, North Dakota revolved around the
Supremacy Clause, not the dormant Commerce Clause. 200 Because a
precise definition of "central purposes" and "clear concerns" remains
elusive, the appellate courts have drastically diverged in their ap-
proaches to applying Bacchus to state direct-shipment laws. 201
III. NEw WINE: STATE DIRECT-SHIPMENT LAWS
AND THE CIRCUIT COURTS
A. The Uncorked Controversy of State Direct-Shipment Laws
To be precise, state direct-shipment laws themselves do not con-
stitute "new wine"; rather, many such laws have been on the books
since shortly after the Twenty-First Amendment's ratification.20 2 Fol-
lowing Prohibition's demise, the vast majority of states implemented a
three-tier regulatory system whereby alcohol producers (tier one) sell
their products to state-licensed wholesalers (tier two), who in turn sell
the goods to state-licensed retailers (tier three), who may then sell to
consumers.203 Statesjustify this three-tier regime on the grounds that
it ensures the orderly collection of taxes, prevents the vertical and hor-
izontal integration of the state alcohol market, and helps fulfill tem-
perance goals. 20 4
Despite direct-shipment laws' vintage status, the advent of e-com-
merce and several recent developments in the wine industry have
196 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 276.
197 Id.
198 495 U.S. 423 (1990).
199 Id. at 432.
200 Id. at 426.
201 See infra Part III.
202 See Ann Faircloth, The Crackdown on Booze-of-the-Month Clubs: Mail-Order Wine
Buyers, Beware!, FORTUNE, Feb. 16, 1998, at 46.
203 Russ Miller, Note, The Wine Is in the Mail: The Twenty-First Amendment and State
Laws Against the Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages, 54 VAND. L. REv. 2495, 2497
(2001).
204 See Susan Lorde Martin, Changing the Law: Update from the Wine War, 17 J.L. &
POL. 63, 64 (2001); Patterson, supra note 101, at 763.
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combined to make the laws a celebrated new legal issue. The 1990s
witnessed a stunning boom in the number of wineries and the volume
of wine sales. Between 1995 and 2000, the number of wineries nation-
wide increased by fourteen percent.20 5 The decade also experienced
a 1579% increase in the sale of wines priced greater than fifteen
dollars. 2 06
Generally, however, only the major labels like Kendall-Jackson
possess the sales volumes capable of profitably penetrating the three-
tier system in all fifty states.20 7 Many connoisseurs can obtain bottles
of their favorite boutique wines only by traveling to out-of-state winer-
ies or having the wine shipped directly to their homes.2 0 8 Thanks to
the rise of e-commerce, consumers can now order wine from all over
the world with the click of a mouse. 20 9 To salvage their three-tier sys-
tems-and the significant amount of tax revenue they generate-
states began aggressively enforcing direct-shipment laws.2 10
The myriad direct-shipment laws adopted at the state level pro-
vide a prime example of federalism in action. By turning alcohol reg-
ulation over to the states, the Twenty-First Amendment encouraged a
diverse legal regime that tailors itself to local attitudes about alcohol.
According to the Wine Institute (an organization that represents the
interests of California wineries), direct-shipment laws fall into three
broad categories: 2 11 (1) twenty-four states prohibit direct shipments of
wine, and four of those states make direct-shipment violations a fel-
205 Martin, supra note 17, at 2.
206 Andrew J. Kozusko III, Note, The Fight to "Free the Grapes" Enters Federal Court:
Constitutional Challenges to the Validity of State Prohibitions on the Direct Shipment of Alcohol,
20J.L. & CoM. 75, 77-78 (2000). In 1999, Chase Bailey, a former Cisco Systems exec-
utive, made his contribution to the 1990s wine boom by purchasing one large bottle
of 1992 Screaming Eagle Cabernet Sauvignon for $500,000 at an auction. Id. at
75-76, 75 n.3.
207 See Vijay Shanker, Note, Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws, the Commerce Clause, and
the Twenty-First Amendment, 85 VA. L. REv. 353, 364 (1999); Stephanie Ahrens Waller,
Note, Bacchus Rules: Recent Court Decisions on the Direct Shipment of Wine, 40 Hous. L.
REV. 1111, 1114 (2003).
208 See Shanker, supra note 207, at 367.
209 In fact, "a Solomon Smith Barney study suggests that internet wine sales will go
from under $100 million in 1998 to nearly $3 billion by 2005." Martin, supra note 17,
at 8-9 (citing Review & Outlook: America's Musty Wine Laws, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2000,
at A22).
210 Shanker, supra note 207, at 356.
211 See Wine Institute, Direct Shipment Laws by State for Wineries, at http://www.wine
institute.org/shipwine/analysis/intro-analysis.htm (last visited May 8, 2004). Other
commentators divide direct-shipment laws into roughly the same three categories. See
Douglass, supra note 119, at 1648-49; Shanker, supra note 207, at 356-57.
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ony;2 1 2 (2) fourteen states place various limits on direct shipments,
such as mandating special permits, imposing particular tax deadlines,
and requiring consumers to place their direct-shipment orders "on-
site" at the out-of-state winery;2 1 3 and (3) thirteen "reciprocity" states
allow direct-shipments only from states that extend the same courtesy
to their own wineries. 2 14 The Wine Institute's categorization system
demonstrates the vast array of approaches states have taken to address
the direct-shipment issue.
The most controversial direct-shipment laws require wineries to
obtain permits to ship their products directly to consumers, yet allow
only local residents to apply for these permits. Faced with such dis-
crimination, oenophiles and small out-of-state wineries challenged di-
rect-shipment laws in the courts.2 15  On one side, states and
wholesalers contend that direct-shipment laws are crucial to maintain-
ing orderly market conditions, collecting taxes, and preventing mi-
nors from obtaining alcohol over the Internet.2 1 6 Wine producers
and consumers counter that the desire for orderly market conditions
and tax collection cannot run afoul of the dormant Commerce
Clause.2 17 Moreover, they contend that less onerous measures exist to
prevent underage drinkers from abusing direct shipping.2 18 This
Note now turns to the six circuit court decisions on the issue.
212 See Wine Institute, supra note 211 (grouping Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Vermont under the heading "Direct-to-
Consumer Shipment Prohibited," and denoting Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, and
Utah as "felony for winery to direct ship" states).
213 See id. (including Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia,
Washington, D.C., and Wyoming under the category of "Limited Direct Shipping &
Permit States").
214 See id. (categorizing California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Minne-
sota, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin as
"Reciprocity" states).
215 See infra Part III.B.
216 See Martin, supra note 17, at 5-6.
217 See id. at 8.
218 See id. at 37-39 (discussing a model direct-shipment law that requires common
carriers who deliver alcohol to check the identification and obtain the signature of a
person age twenty-one years or older at the delivery address); Shanker, supra note
207, at 358-59 (asserting that "[aiccess by minors can ... be prevented by protective
mechanisms, such as requiring adult signatures upon delivery and warning labels on
packages").
2004] 1593
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
B. Life After Bacchus: Circuit Court Decisions on the
Direct-Shipment Issue
Thus far, six circuit courts have weighed in on the constitutional-
ity of direct-shipment laws. Of these six, two upheld the challenged
direct-shipment laws; 2 19 three struck down the discriminatory state
laws for violating the dormant Commerce Clause;2 20 and one re-
manded to the district court for further evidence.2 2 1 These cases re-
veal that Bacchus's vague two-prong test has generated confusion,
inconsistency, and an even greater depletion of the states' regulatory
power over alcohol.
1. Dismissing Two-Prong Tests and Upholding Direct-Shipment
Laws: Bridenbaugh (Seventh Circuit) and Swedenburg
(Second Circuit)
Despite Bacchus's centrality to the Supreme Court's Twenty-First
Amendment and dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, both the
Seventh and Second Circuits refused to utilize the case's two-prong
test. The Seventh Circuit was the first appellate court to address state
direct-shipment laws in Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson.222 Bridenbaugh
involved an Indiana law requiring out-of-state wine sellers to obtain a
wholesaler license before importing wine directly to in-state consum-
ers.223 The plaintiffs, a group of consumers, challenged the law as a
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.2 2 4 Although Indiana
only granted these permits to state residents-a seemingly discrimina-
tory practice-the plaintiffs did not attack this provision.2 25 Rather,
their claim "concerned only . . .direct shipments from out-of-state
sellers who lack [ed] and [did] not want Indiana permits." 226
Judge Easterbrook began his analysis in a fashion true to the
Young's Market line of cases. Acknowledging that both parties' briefs
focused on the Twenty-First Amendment's "core purposes," the court
asserted that "our guide is the text and history of the Constitution, not
the 'purposes' or 'concerns' that may or may not have animated its
219 Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 237 (2d Cir. 2004); Bridenbaugh v. Free-
man-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 854 (7th Cir. 2000).
220 Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 527 (6th Cir. 2003); Dickerson v. Bailey, 336
F.3d 388, 409-10 (5th Cir. 2003); Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 517 (4th Cir. 2003).
221 Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1116 (11th Cir. 2002).
222 227 F.3d at 848.
223 Id. at 849.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 854.
226 Id.
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drafters. Objective indicators supply the context for § 2; suppositions
about mental processes are unilluminating. '" 227 Judge Easterbrook
then conducted a historical overview of the events leading up to the
Twenty-First Amendment's enactment. 228 Drawing on this history, he
concluded, "[n] o longer may the dormant Commerce Clause be read
to protect interstate shipments of liquor from regulation: § 2 speaks
directly to these shipments.."229 In other words, up to this point in the
opinion, Judge Eaterbrook seemed precariously close to completely
ignoring Bacchus.
However, Judge Easterbrook then summarized the Supreme
Court's Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence as holding that "the
greater power to forbid imports does not imply the lesser power to
allow imports on discriminatory terms."230 Because Indiana insisted
"every drop of liquor pass through its three-tier system and be sub-
jected to taxation,"231 the court found no such discrimination and up-
held the challenged provision of Indiana's direct-shipment law.23 2
Based on the Seventh Circuit's approach, any law discriminating
against foreign liquor is unconstitutional-end of analysis. The
Twenty-First Amendment's "core concerns" do not apply and cannot
save an otherwise discriminatory law. Thus, paradoxically, even
though it upheld Indiana's law, and largely ignored the Supreme
227 Id. at 851.
228 Id. at 851-53.
229 Id. at 853.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 854. Before taking the benchJudge Easterbrook represented the liquor
importers and succeeded in overturning Hawaii's liquor-tax scheme in Bacchus. Inter-
estingly, Judge Easterbrook's Bridenbaugh opinion not only eschews the Supreme
Court's two-prong test from Bacchus, it also conflicts in certain respects with the argu-
ments he made before the Supreme Court in that case. Just as Judge Easterbrook
determined in Bridenbaugh that the Twenty-First Amendment did not permit discrimi-
nation against out-of-state commerce, his clients' brief in Bacchus asserted that "Sec-
tion 2... provides no basis for discriminatory state taxes." Brief for Appellant at 29,
Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (No. 82-1565). In this respect, his
Bridenbaugh opinion and the Bacchus brief are entirely consistent.
However, the brief also argued that "[t]he central pupose of section 2 was to allow
states wishing entirely to exclude alcoholic beverages from their borders to do so." Id.
(emphasis added). Judge Easterbrook supported his understanding of Section 2's
"central purpose" by citing Senators Blaine's and Borah's remarks during the floor
debates on S.J. Res. 211. Id. at 34; see also supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
In other words, the Bacchus brief refutes Judge Easterbrook's quip in Bridenbaugh that
"our guide is the text and history of the Constitution, not the 'purposes' or 'concerns'
that may or may not have animated its drafters." Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 851. Ironi-
cally, the "central purpose" approach Judge Easterbrook zealously advocated before
the Supreme Court in Bacchus became the very approach he rejected in Bridenbaugh.
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Court's methodology, the Seventh Circuit placed even greater limits
on state liquor control than Bacchus.
In Swedenburg v. Kelly,233 the Second Circuit also dismissed
Bacchus's two-prong test and upheld New York's direct-shipment law.
Under New York law, out-of-state wineries can obtain licenses to ship
wine directly to New York consumers. 234 To secure this license, how-
ever, the out-of-state wineries must first establish and maintain a physi-
cal presence (e.g., branch office or warehouse) in New York.235 Two
out-of-state wineries and three New York wine consumers challenged
the licensing scheme for "provid[ing] an unconstitutional advantage
to in-state wineries." 23 6
Writing for the court, Judge Wesley expressly rejected Bacchus's
analytical framework: "We think this two-step approach is flawed be-
cause it has the effect of unnecessarily limiting the authority delegated
to the states through the clear and unambiguous language of section
2."237 Acknowledging that other courts regarded Bacchus's two-prong
test as binding precedent, Judge Wesley responded in a footnote that
"1[w] e are hard pressed to find any mandate from the Court directing
us to utilize Bacchus as a template in analyzing the New York stat-
ute."2 38 Rather, he reasoned, Bacchus merely stands for the proposi-
tion that states cannot "invoke section 2 as a pretext for economic
protectionism."239
The Second Circuit instead opted for a "second mode of analy-
sis,"240 which derived from the court's interpretation of the history2 4'
and jurisprudence 242 underlying Section 2. This alternative approach
"considers the scope of the Twenty-first Amendment's grant of author-
ity to the states to determine whether the challenged statute is within
the ambit of that authority, such that it is exempted from the effect of
the dormant Commerce Clause."243 According to the Second Circuit,
New York's "regulatory regime falls squarely within the ambit of sec-
tion 2's grant of authority... [because it] regulates only the importa-
tion and distribution of alcohol in New York."244
233 Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004).
234 Id. at 229.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 231.
238 Id. at 236 n.10.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 231.
241 Id. at 231-33.
242 Id. at 233-37.
243 Id. at 231.
244 Id. at 237.
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Moreover, Judge Wesley asserted that New York's law does not
run afoul of Bacchus's ban on "'mere economic protectionism,'" 245
because "[a] 11 wineries, whether in-state or out-of-state, are permitted
to obtain a license as long as the winery establishes a physical presence
in the state. ' 246 Judge Wesley conceded that New York's law "could
create substantial dormant Commerce Clause problems if [it] regu-
lated a commodity other than alcohol."247 Indeed, "out-of-state winer-
ies will incur some costs in establishing and maintaining a physical
presence in New York, costs not incurred by in-state wineries."248 De-
spite such discrimination, the court ruled that "[t] hese effects ... do
not alter the legitimacy of section 2's delegation of authority."249
Although the Second Circuit claimed to adopt the Seventh Cir-
cuit's analytical approach, 250 Judge Wesley's and Judge Easterbrook's
opinions seem to allow for different amounts of state power under the
Twenty-First Amendment. According to Bridenbaugh, the Twenty-First
Amendment cannot save discriminatory state liquor laws. Swedenburg,
on the other hand, suggests that the Twenty-First Amendment enables
states to enact some discriminatory liquor laws, so long as the laws
serve valid regulatory interests. By limiting Bacchus, and relying in-
stead on a test that places state liquor laws largely beyond the dormant
Commerce Clause's reach, the Second Circuit seemingly took a step
toward reviving Young's Market. As the following cases demonstrate,
however, the Second Circuit is currently the only appellate court to
move in this direction.
2. Faithful to Bacchus- Beskind (Fourth Circuit) and Dickerson
(Fifth Circuit)
Unlike the Seventh and Second Circuits, the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits followed Bacchus's two-pronged approach as faithfully as pos-
sible. In Beskind v. Easley,251 a California winery and individual oe-
nophiles challenged North Carolina's direct-shipment laws. 252 North
Carolina's laws required all out-of-state wine producers to sell through
the state's three-tier system but allowed in-state wine manufacturers to
ship their products directly to consumers.253 The plaintiffs alleged
245 Id. (quoting Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984)).
246 Id.
247 Id. at 238.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 See id. at 231.
251 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003).
252 Id. at 509.
253 Id. at 510.
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that this discrepancy between out-of-state and in-state wine producers
constituted unconstitutional discrimination. 254
Writing for the court, Judge Niemeyer noted that Bacchus re-
quired him to first consider whether North Carolina's law was facially
discriminatory and then, if so, to determine if the Twenty-First
Amendment saved the otherwise unconstitutional law.25 5 In accor-
dance with this two-prong approach, the court began by subjecting
North Carolina's law to a strict scrutiny analysis. 256 After determining
the law facially discriminated against out-of-state wine, Judge
Niemeyer concluded the state had failed to satisfy its burden of dem-
onstrating that no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives
existed.257
Next, Judge Niemeyer considered whether the facially discrimina-
tory law served "'any clear concern of the Twenty-first Amendment'
and [was] thereby saved."25 8 To further define these "clear concerns,"
the Fourth Circuit adopted the North Dakota Court's three criteria of
"'promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and
raising revenue.' "259 After considering the state's justifications for its
discriminatory regulatory regime, the court concluded the state's law
"could not credibly be portrayed as anything other than local eco-
nomic boosterism in the guise of a law aimed at alcoholic beverage
control."260 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit struck down the resi-
dency requirement provision of North Carolina's direct-shipment
statute. 26
1
Similarly, in Dickerson v. Baiey,2 6 2 the Fifth Circuit considered the
constitutionality of a Texas law that allowed in-state-but not out-of-
state-wine producers to ship their products directly to Texas con-
sumers.263 Moreover, the statute enabled Texas wineries to sell 25,000
gallons of wine directly to in-state consumers each year (with no per
customer restrictions), but annually allowed Texans to personally
bring into the state only three gallons from an out-of-state winery.264
254 Id. at 511.
255 Id. at 513-14.
256 See id. at 514-16.
257 Id. at 515-16.
258 Id. at 516 (quoting Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984)).
259 Id. at 513, 516 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432
(1990)).
260 Id. at 517.
261 Id.
262 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003).
263 Id. at 397.
264 Id. at 397-98.
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A group of oenophiles from Houston alleged that these provisions vio-
lated the dormant Commerce Clause. 265
Like the Fourth Circuit, Judge Wiener of the Fifth Circuit ac-
knowledged that Supreme Court precedent prescribed use of
Bacchus's two-prong test.2 66 Noting the statute's facial discrimination,
and highlighting the Texas Legislature's candid declarations of its dis-
criminatory aspirations,267 the court asserted the case's "operable facts
* . . [were] identical" to those in Bacchus.268 Accordingly, Judge Wie-
ner ruled that the Texas law discriminated against interstate com-
merce269 and did not constitute the only available means by which
Texas could achieve its regulatory goals. 270
Turning to the Bacchus test's second prong, the court initially
cited "the promotion of temperance" as the amendment's core con-
cern. 271 However, it then noted some courts had also incorporated
other policies into the test, such as "the prevention of monopolies or
organized crime from (re)gaining control of the alcohol industry and
the collection of taxes." 272 Regardless, the court's second stage of
analysis did not need to proceed much past this point. The adminis-
trator of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission "reject[ed] out-
right any requirement that he proffer evidence connecting the
disputed statutes to the 'core concerns' of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment."2 73 Given that the administrator had not presented any argu-
ments to the contrary, the Fifth Circuit struck down Texas' law as
unconstitutional. 274
The Fourth and Fifth Circuit opinions demonstrated the confu-
sion resulting from the Supreme Court's failure to define the Twenty-
First Amendment's "core concerns" in Bacchus. While the Fourth Cir-
cuit looked to the three criteria set forth in North Dakota, the Fifth
Circuit hinted at a narrower test, which may have focused on the "pro-
motion of temperance." Depending on which definition of "core con-
cerns" a court adopts, the range of acceptable justifications for a
state's regulatory regime can vary considerably.
265 Id. at 392.
266 Id. at 394-95.
267 Id. at 399-400.
268 Id. at 400.
269 Id. at 402-03.
270 Id. at 401-02.
271 Id. at 404.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 406.
274 Id. at 407.
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3. Scrutinizing the "Core Concerns": Bainbridge (Eleventh Circuit)
and Heald (Sixth Circuit)
The Eleventh and Sixth Circuits applied Bacchus's two-prong test
in novel ways and placed even stricter limits on state regulatory power.
In Bainbridge v. Turner,275 Judge Tjoflat of the Eleventh Circuit consid-
ered a challenge to Florida's direct-shipment laws, which allowed in-
state wineries to ship directly to consumers. 276 Out-of-state wineries,
on the other hand, risked treble damages and a felony conviction for
directly shipping their products. 277
Like the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, the Bainbridge court recited
the need to follow Bacchus.278 And similarly, the court found Florida's
law facially discriminatory and determined that nondiscriminatory al-
ternatives existed.279 Turning to the test's second prong, however, the
Eleventh Circuit took an unprecedented step: it required the state to
not only facially demonstrate that its law satisfied the Twenty-First
Amendment's "core concerns," but it also mandated the production
of extensive supporting evidence.2 80 Noting that it lacked clear gui-
dance from the Supreme Court on the definition of "core concerns,"
Judge Tjoflat settled on North Dakota's three criteria. 281 Although
Florida asserted that its law facilitated temperance, orderly market
conditions, and the collection of revenue, 28 2 the court deemed such
justifications unsatisfactory. 283 Rather, Florida had to demonstrate "its
statutory scheme [was] necessary to effectuate the proffered core con-
cern in a way thatjustifie [d] treating out-of-state firms differently from
in-state firms-a fact question."284 This evidentiary standard was alleg-
edly "far less than the strict scrutiny required under a traditional tier-
one analysis of discriminatory laws." 285 Regardless, it still required the
court to remand Bainbridge for further consideration of Florida's
justification. 286
275 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002).
276 Id. at 1106-07.
277 Id. at 1107; see also notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
278 Id. at 1108.
279 Id. at 1109-10.
280 Id. at 1114.
281 Id. at 1113-14.
282 Id. at 1114-15.
283 See id.
284 Id. at 1115.
285 Id. at 1115 n.17.
286 Id. 1115-16.
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Judge Daughtrey of the Sixth Circuit adopted an even stricter evi-
dentiary standard in Heald v. Engler.28 7 Michigan's direct-shipment
laws allowed in-state wineries to obtain a wholesaler's license but did
not extend the same privilege to out-of-state wineries. 28 8 Conse-
quently, a collection of wine consumers, a small out-of-state winery,
and wine journalists brought a dormant Commerce Clause chal-
lenge.2 8 9 After addressing the first-prong of Bacchus and finding
Michigan's law "facially discriminatory,"290 the court moved to the sec-
ond-prong analysis.
The Sixth Circuit struggled to define the Twenty-First Amend-
ment's "core concerns." Earlier in its opinion, the court acknowl-
edged that "[s]ince Bacchus, the Supreme Court has been less than
prolific in construing the content of the Twenty-first Amendment's
'core concerns.' ' '29 1 Thus, when it began the prong-two "core con-
cern" analysis, it initially cited North Dakota's three policies as the ap-
propriate standard. 292 Yet, two paragraphs later, Judge Daughtrey
declared that the court could not rely on North Dakota because it "in-
volved a Supremacy Clause challenge and did not implicate the Com-
merce Clause. '293 Accordingly, the court stated it needed to rely on
"cases that do discuss the intersection of the Twenty-first Amendment
and the Commerce Clause, such as Bacchus.''294 Unable to identify a
suitable definition for "core concerns," the court forged ahead with its
analysis.
Next, Judge Daughtrey curiously incorporated Bacchus's prong-
one strict scrutiny standard into her prong-two analysis. Although
Bacchus's prong-one test requires courts to apply a strict scrutiny stan-
dard to facially discriminatory laws, prong-two specifies no such stan-
dard of review.295 Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit claimed that
"Supreme Court precedent" required strict scrutiny when determin-
ing whether the Twenty-First Amendment empowered Michigan to
enact discriminatory liquor laws. 29 6 Because it was "not enough that
the Michigan Legislature ha[d] chosen this particular regulatory
287 342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003).
288 See id. at 520.
289 Id. at 519.
290 Id. at 525.
291 Id. at 523.
292 Id. at 525-26.
293 Id. at 526.
294 Id.
295 See supra notes 177-86 and accompanying text.
296 Heald, 342 F.3d at 527.
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scheme to further what are legitimate objectives,"29 7 the Sixth Circuit
struck down the state's direct-shipment law.29 8
Needless to say, this type of circuit court disarray would have
never occurred under Justice Brandeis's simple bright-line rule from
Young's Market.299 Yet such is the price of the Court's intervention
into an area of commerce that Congress deemed best handled by the
states. So long as the Supreme Court maintains its vague two-prong
test, the lower courts will continue to reach disparate holdings, and
state regulatory power over alcohol will commensurately dwindle. Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court should utilize direct-shipment laws as
an opportunity to overturn Bacchus and reinstate the Young's Market
line of cases.
IV. RUPTURE OR RENEWAL: WHEN DIRECT-SHIPMENT LAWS
MEET THE REHNQUIST COURT
Thus far, this Note has discussed numerous cases dealing with the
Twenty-First Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause; mark-
edly, not a single one mentioned the principle of federalism. In the
years following Bacchus, however, the Supreme Court has increasingly
relied upon federalist values to strike down federal laws.300 Indeed,
"[i] t seems agreed on all sides now that the Supreme Court has an
agenda of promoting constitutional federalism. '" 30 1
This purported "antifederalist revival"302 has not enjoyed broad
support within the Court. On the contrary, the Court's recent cases
involving federalism have divided along 5-4 lines, with Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Jus-
tice Thomas in the majority, andJustice StevensJustice SouterJustice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer dissenting.303 This Part explores direct-
shipment laws in the context of the 5-4 federalism split. The Twenty-
First Amendment constitutes a rare example of Congress and the
states shifting the balance of federalism in favor of state power. 30 4
297 Id.
298 Id. at 527-28.
299 See supra Part II.A.1.
300 Between 1991 and 2002, the Court "held at least ten federal statutes to be
constitutionally invalid, either in whole or in part, on grounds involving federalism.
By contrast, the Court had found only one federal statute to violate principles of con-
stitutional federalism during the previous span of more than fifty years ... Fallon,
supra note 35, at 430.
301 Id. at 429.
302 SuLLvAN & GUNTHER, supra note 26, at 230.
303 See Fallon, supra note 35, at 430.
304 See supra Part I.C.
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Thus, paradoxically, Justices on both sides of the 5-4 divide-those
who support the judicial enforcement of federalism and those who
favor a political solution-have ample reason to uphold direct-ship-
ment laws on federalism grounds. Moreover, in the interests of salvag-
ing the dormant Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment,
both camps should vote to overrule Bacchus.
A. The Fragile Seams of Federalism
1. States' Rights and the Current Five-Justice Majority
On one side of the debate stands the five-Justice majority, which
used federalism to strike down multiple federal laws for unconstitu-
tionally encroaching upon state sovereignty. United States v. Lopez30 5
constitutes perhaps the most famous example of the Court's willing-
ness to intervene on the states' behalf. In Lopez, the Court considered
the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made it
a federal offense for an individual to knowingly possess a firearm in a
school zone. 306 During the roughly sixty years prior to Lopez, the
Court did not overturn a single exercise of congressional commerce
power;30 7 thus, the Commerce Clause acquired an aura of virtual
omnipotence.
However, the Lopez Court unexpectedly halted this trend.30, In
an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that
Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause and struck
down the Gun-Free School Zones Act.3 0 9 Although the Court did not
overturn any of its prior decisions, the opinion made it clear that Con-
gress could no longer "convert [its] authority under the Commerce
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States."3 1 0
305 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
306 See id. at 551.
307 See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 26, at 137-49 (providing an overview of
the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence between 1937 and 1995).
308 The unexpectedness of the Court's decision is aptly illustrated by Professor
Jesse H. Choper's pre-Lopez prediction that "the Supreme Court will uphold the con-
stitutionality of [the Gun-Free School Zones Act] .... The true surprise will be if
there are many dissenting votes." Jesse H. Choper, The Supreme Court and Unconstitu-
tional Conditions: Federalism and Individual Rights, 4 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 460, 463
(1995).
309 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
310 Id. at 567; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000)
(holding that § 13,981 of the Violence Against Women Act exceeded Congress's com-
merce power).
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Following this decision, some commentators declared that a states'
rights revolution was officially underway within the Court.311
Two years later, in Printz v. United States, 312 the Court struck down
a portion of the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act, which re-
quired state law enforcement officers to help administer federal back-
ground checks on prospective handgun purchasers. 313 Because the
Act constituted "executive-commandeering" of state officers, the
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, declared the law "funda-
mentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sover-
eignty."314 This ruling established that the principle of federalism
prevented Congress from commanding state officers to enforce a fed-
eral regulatory scheme.
Combined with multiple cases upholding state sovereign immu-
nity under the Eleventh Amendment, 15 decisions like Lopez and
Printz signal a trend toward curbing the federal government's power.
While some commentators viewed this jurisprudential shift as drastic
"right-wing judicial activism," 316 others labeled the Court's purported
federalism agenda as "modest and equivocal."3 17 Regardless, respect
for state sovereignty has enjoyed a resurgence under the Rehnquist
Court.
Professor Susan Lorde Martin focuses on the Lopez and Printz line
of cases to predict the Court's ruling on direct-shipment laws.318 Not-
311 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Focus on Federal Power, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1995, at
Al (asserting "it is only a slight exaggeration to say that.., the Court [is] a single vote
shy of reinstalling the Articles of Confederation").
312 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
313 Id. at 902-04.
314 Id. at 916, 935.
315 See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-92 (2000) (ruling that
Congress cannot use its civil rights enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 712-30 (1999) (extending state sovereign immunity to lawsuits brought against
states in state court); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-73 (1996) (holding
that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce
Clause). Based in part on his overview of the Rehnquist Court's Eleventh Amend-
ment jurisprudence, see Martin, supra note 23, at 1333-42, one commentator con-
cludes that the Court "will, unfortunately, uphold the power of the states to prohibit
and limit the direct-shipment of wine from out-of-state." Id. at 1344.
316 See Cass R. Sunstein, Tilting the Scales Rightward, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001, at
A23.
317 Robert F. Nagel, Real Revolution, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 985, 1003-04 (1997).
318 See Martin, supra note 17, at 22-25; see also Eng, supra note 23, at 1915-16
(drawing upon the Printz and Lopez line of cases to argue that the "conservative"
Rehnquist Court will likely uphold state direct-shipment laws). Although he does not
mention specific cases, Professor Brannon P. Denning asserts that "[t]here is a certain
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ing the Court's "recent record of state's rights in a variety of circum-
stances," Professor Martin suggests the Court's potential willingness to
strike down direct-shipment laws "is far from a certainty."31 9 She notes
that the Lopez Court overturned the Gun-Free School Zones Act on
the grounds that "criminal law is a subject of primary state responsibil-
ity."3 20 Accordingly, the Court may uphold direct-shipment laws be-
cause "alcoholic beverage control is, too, a subject of primary state
responsibility . . . [and i]f federalism is to have real meaning, there
have to be some areas in which states have exclusive power."3 21
Professor Martin correctly points out that the likes of Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor will probably view direct-ship-
ment laws at least partly in terms of states' rights. Indeed, the Twenty-
First Amendment constitutes one of the Constitution's few express
commitments of state power. These two Justices dissented in Bacchus
on the grounds that the amendment's broad constitutional language
gave states the power to discriminate against out-of-state liquor.32 2 To
protect the states' constitutionally ensured right to regulate alcohol,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor very well might vote to
overturn Bacchus and uphold direct-shipment laws.
However, the dissenting opinion from Bacchus also provides the
major reason why Professor Martin's analysis of federalism and direct-
shipment laws comes up short: Justice Stevens. Justice Stevens's dis-
senting opinion suggests he will view dormant Commerce Clause chal-
lenges to state direct-shipment laws as "squarely foreclosed by the
Twenty-first Amendment."323 Yet, his views on federalism are diamet-
rically opposed to those of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor. Thus, if Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and
Justice Stevens find the two additional votes necessary to overturn
Bacchus, their holding will not fit into the current "antifederalist
revival." 324
irony that in the midst of the most vigorous judicial enforcement of federalism in over
sixty years, a specific textual reservation of power to states [i.e., the Twenty-First
Amendment] has been eroded almost to the point of irrelevance." Denning, supra
note 111, at 335.
319 Martin, supra note 17, at 22.
320 Id. at 23.
321 Id.
322 See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
323 468 U.S. 263, 279 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
324 But see Timothy Schnabel, Note, A Circuit-Splitting Headache: The Hangover of the
Supreme Court's Twenty-First Amendment Jurisprudence, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 547, 556
(2003) (positing that "an even more aggressively pro-state outcome is possible should
two additional Justices side with the three Bacchus dissenters and hold that even dis-
criminatory statutes are permitted").
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2. Politically Enforced Federalism: The Curious Case of Justice
Stevens
How can one explain Justice Stevens's broad reading of the
Twenty-First Amendment based on the principle of federalism? The
answer lies partly in a pre-Lopez and pre-Printz case that the Rehnquist
Court has yet to expressly overrule- Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.a2 5 As mentioned in the Introduction, much of the
current Court's disagreement over federalism revolves around
whether the political system or the courts should serve as the doc-
tine's primary guardian. The direct-shipment law issue presents a
unique situation in which the lines separating these two theories be-
come blurred.
In Garcia, the Court ruled that the Fair Labor Standards Act's
minimum wage and overtime requirements applied to a municipal
transit authority. 326 Justice Stevens joined Justice Blackmun's 5-4 ma-
jority opinion, which asserted the "principal means chosen by the
Framers to insure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the
structure of the Federal Government itself. '3 27 Because the political
system had settled on a policy requiring state compliance with federal
labor standards, there was no need for the "unelected federal judici-
ary to [decide] which state policies it favor[ed] and which ones it dis-
like[d]. '"328 Justice O'Connor countered in her dissenting opinion
that "lIt] he problems of federalism. . . are capable of a more responsi-
ble resolution than holding that the States as States retain no status
apart from that which Congress chooses to let them retain."3 29
Rather, she asserted, the Court needed to intervene when the federal
government overstepped its bounds.330
Although Justice O'Connor's view appears to have since gained
the upper hand, Justice Stevens and his fellow Lopez/Printz dissenters
continue to prefer political solutions to purported imbalances in the
federalist system. For example, in Printz, Justice Stevens argued in dis-
sent that "unelected judges are better off leaving the protection of
federalism to the political process in all but the most extraordinary
325 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
326 Id. at 555-56.
327 Id. at 550.
328 Id. at 546.
329 Id. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
330 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In his terse dissenting opinion, ChiefJustice
Rehnquist wrote: "I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out
further the fine points of principle that will, I am confident, in time again command
support of the majority of this Court." Id. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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circumstances." 33 1 When Congress has determined how to best "serve
the interests of cooperative federalism," he argued, the courts should
"respect both its policy judgment and its appraisal of its constitutional
power."33
2
The Twenty-First Amendment exemplifies Justice Stevens's desire
for political solutions to issues of federalism. Throughout the more
than one hundred years leading up to Prohibition, Congress evinced a
clear preference for allowing the states to broadly regulate the liquor
trade. This policy predilection derived from a belief that alcohol con-
stituted a peculiar article of commerce best left to local regulatory
regimes. The federal government's resounding failure to effectively
enforce nationwide prohibition only confirmed this conviction. Thus,
Congress and the states joined forces to push through a constitutional
amendment to ensure the states' dominion over liquor intended for
"delivery or use therein. '33 3 Viewed in such a light, Justice Stevens's
broad interpretation of the Twenty-First Amendment neatly squares
with his vision of federalism.
Accordingly, the Twenty-First Amendment fosters the unlikely
confluence of Printz and Garcia-on the one hand, it constitutes a
commitment to states' rights; on the other, it represents a political
solution to federalism. Taken together, these two values provide at
least one way of bridging the traditional 5-4 federalism divide. Even if
the Court refrains from expressly discussing federalism when it takes
up the direct-shipment issue, it should keep federalist values in mind.
Otherwise, the reasoning underpinning each side of the federalism
debate will incur ajurisprudential rupture. If the Court's states' rights
advocates meekly uphold Bacchus in striking down direct-shipment
laws, they will abdicate their professed duty to defend state sover-
eignty. If the Court's proponents of politically determined federalism
follow the same path, they will let judicial activism trump Congress
and the states' joint solution to the liquor conundrum. Thus, both
sides of the federalism debate should seize upon direct-shipment laws
as an opportunity to renew the Young's Market line of cases.
B. The Ever Expanding Dormant Commerce Clause
Should the Court overrule Bacchus and uphold direct-shipment
laws, it will also preserve another imperiled piece of its jurisprudential
patchwork: the dormant Commerce Clause. Unlike the principle of
federalism, which the Court's Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence
331 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 959 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
332 Id. at 970 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
333 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
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has steadily eroded, the dormant Commerce Clause runs the risk of
rupturing because it has expanded too far. Beginning with In re
Rahrer,33 4 the Court has consistently affirmed the notion that Congress
can utilize its commerce power to revoke the Court's use of the dor-
mant Commerce Clause.
Through the Wilson Act and the Webb-Kenyon Act, Congress at-
tempted to exercise its power to divest liquor of its interstate charac-
ter. Intending to take this concept one step further, Congress and the
states enacted a constitutional amendment that shielded state liquor
regulations from the dormant Commerce Clause in a way legislation
never could. Justice Brandeis (who first interpreted the amendment a
mere three years after its ratification) recognized the amendment as
having achieved this goal.3 35 Likewise, Justice Black (who participated
in the Senate debates on the Twenty-First Amendment) regarded the
amendment's purpose as patently clear.33 6 Rather than risk trampling
an express textual provision of the Constitution with a judicial infer-
ence, the Court should err on the side of caution and deem direct-
shipment laws valid.
This need to proceed cautiously should hold true for the dor-
mant Commerce Clause's champions and critics alike. For the doc-
trine to maintain its legitimacy, there can be no doubt that Congress
retains its commerce power over alcohol regulation, albeit in a "dor-
mant" state. When the Court invokes the dormant Commerce Clause
in an area where Congress has ceded its commerce power to the
states, the doctrine's credibility becomes attenuated at best. A doc-
trine ofjudicial intervention begins to look more like a doctrine ofjudi-
cial activism. Thus, those who regard the dormant Commerce Clause
as valid should stay their hands when it comes to liquor regulations
like direct-shipment laws.
Furthermore, the Twenty-First Amendment gives those who reject
the dormant Commerce Clause even more reason to do so in the di-
rect-shipment context. Regarding the doctrine as a textless vehicle for
judicial activism, these critics should have no problem exercising judi-
cial restraint. In Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co.,3 3 7
Justice Black argued in dissent that "[i]t seems a trifle odd to hold that
an Amendment adopted in 1933 in specific terms to meet a specific
twentieth-century problem must yield to [the Export-Import Clause,]
a provision written in 1787 to meet a more general, although no less
334 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
335 See supra Part II.A.
336 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
337 377 U.S. 341 (1964).
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important, problem. '338 Similarly, critics of the dormant Commerce
Clause can argue that it seems outright absurd that the Twenty-First
Amendment must yield to a judge-made doctrine that was never "writ-
ten" anywhere in the Constitution. Moreover, those who regard the
dormant Commerce Clause as a disruption of the Framers' intended
federalist system should have even greater reservations about the doc-
trine's impact on liquor regulation-an area of commerce the
Twenty-First Amendment turned over to state control.
C. The Incredible Shrinking Twenty-First Amendment
The Twenty-First Amendment constitutes perhaps the most en-
dangered piece of the Court's jurisprudential patchwork. Young's
Market acknowledged the amendment as having freed states of the
dormant Commerce Clause's strictures. Bacchus, however, reduced
the amendment to a mere last-ditch provision, which comes into play
only after the courts conduct a strict scrutiny dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. In two major respects, direct-shipment laws present
the Twenty-First Amendment with a make-or-break proposition.
First, direct-shipment laws strike at the heart of the Twenty-First
Amendment's text. Assuming, arguendo, that the amendment's text
is ambiguous, one thing remains certain: the phrases "central pur-
poses" and "clear concerns" appear nowhere in Section 2. Moreover,
the amendment never provides a special distinction between discrimi-
natory and nondiscriminatory liquor regulations. Rather, the amend-
ment plainly proscribes the importation of wine into any state, "for
delivery or use therein," in violation of a state's direct-shipment
laws.339 As Justice Brandeis quipped in Young's Market, to say other-
wise "would involve not a construction of the amendment, but a re-
writing of it."340 The Court essentially rewrote the amendment with
Bacchus and should now seize upon direct-shipment laws as an oppor-
tunity to restore the provision to its original purpose.
Second, if the Court strikes down direct-shipment laws, it truly
will have come full circle. In Rhodes, the Court frustrated state at-
tempts to regulate mail-ordered direct shipments from out-of-state li-
quor producers to in-state consumers. Congress responded with the
Webb-Kenyon Act and, subsequently, united with the states to free li-
quor from the dormant Commerce Clause's grip via the Twenty-First
Amendment. Needless to say, the technology has changed over the
years: out-of-state wineries now accept Internet orders via DSL connec-
338 Id. at 348 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
339 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
340 State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936).
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tions instead of mail orders via Pony Express. Yet, the concept of li-
quor's constitutionally divested character remains the same. Rather
than continue back down the road to Rhodes, the Court should re-
adopt the deference it showed to the states shortly after the Twenty-
First Amendment's enactment.
CONCLUSION
Thomas Jefferson, the man who spent over fifty years unsuccess-
fully trying to establish his own vineyard at Monticello, 34 1 would un-
doubtedly toast the recent exponential growth of small wineries.3 42
Even more to the point, he would probably hope the ongoing boom
in wine sales signals that the nation's attitude toward wine has
changed to the point where direct-shipment laws will soon become yet
another curious remnant of America's temperance-laden past.
Yet it seems equally plausible that a staunch states' rights propo-
nent like Jefferson 343 would favor letting the states determine when
and how wine should once again flow directly to the homes of oe-
nophiles. If direct-shipment laws have outlived their usefulness, each
state can certainly amend its own laws to accommodate this cultural
transformation. 344 Alternatively, perhaps Section 2 of the Twenty-First
Amendment-like its predecessor the Eighteenth Amendment-
should even be repealed. If so, Congress and the states can play their
constitutionally prescribed role in bringing about such an
amendment.345
Either way, the amendment's fate should rest in the hands of leg-
islators, not in those of the unelected judiciary. When the Court es-
tablished its two-prong test in Bacchus, it essentially declared itself
better suited to determine the nation's alcohol policy than the states
341 PINNEY, supra note 2, at 129 (noting that between 1771 and 1822, Jefferson
made numerous unsuccessful attempts to establish his own vineyard in Monticello by
planting various native and imported vines).
342 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
343 For example, Jefferson boldly asserted in the Kentucky Resolutions "that the
several States composing the United States of America, are not united on the princi-
ple of unlimited submission to their general government." STATES' RIGHTS, supra
note 29, at 81. Rather, Jefferson argued, each state possesses "the residuary mass of
right to [its] own self-government." Id. Given that the Twenty-First Amendment con-
stitutes one of the Constitution's few express grants of power to the states, Jefferson's
antifederalist leanings may have ultimately outweighed his oenophilia.
344 See also Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 239 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Changes in
marketing techniques or national consumer demand for a product do not alter the
meaning of a constitutional amendment. If New York wishes to further relax its regu-
latory control of the flow of wine into New York, it can do so.").
345 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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and Congress. This display of judicial activism calls into question the
Court's federalism and dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Rather than risk further undermining these two doctrines-let alone
the Twenty-First Amendment-the Court should scrap its current ju-
risprudential patchwork of "old wineskins" and re-stitch a container
capable of accommodating the "new wine" of direct-shipment laws.
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